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THE TENSION BETWEEN STATUTES OF REPOSE
AND THE ACCRUAL DATE OF A CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR INDEMNIFICATION:
CONSIDERING THE IMPLICATIONS OF
CHRISTUS ST. VINCENT V. DUARTE-AFARA
Erin K. Jackson (Joyce)*

I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2011, the New Mexico Court of Appeals issued its decision
in Christus St. Vincent v. Duarte-Afara,1 a case wherein Christus St. Vincent Regional Medical Center (“the Hospital”) filed a cause of action for
indemnification against two negligent doctors. The court of appeals held
that the indemnification claim, which was filed by the Hospital after the
passage of the statute of limitations in the Medical Malpractice Act (“the
Act”), was barred by the Act’s statute of repose.
This note reviews the decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals
in Christus St. Vincent and then discusses the competing purposes of indemnification and the statute of repose in the Act. Additional information about the policies that support statutes of repose and
indemnification is discussed, including the court of appeals’ review or
neglect of these principles. Finally, this note discusses the potential implications of the Christus St. Vincent decision, which is likely to affect areas
of law beyond medical malpractice.
II. HISTORY OF CHRISTUS ST. VINCENT V. DUARTE-AFARA
A. Basic Factual and Procedural Background
The New Mexico Court of Appeals’ holding in Christus St. Vincent addressed the Hospital’s third-party complaint for indemnifica-

* University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2013. I would like to thank
Professor Rob Schwartz for his boundless encouragement and advice, and Professor
Michael Browde for his patient guidance with this article. Above all, I am grateful to
Darius Jackson for his unwavering support and infinite enthusiasm for all of my
endeavors.
1. 2011-NMCA-112, 267 P.3d 70, cert. quashed, 2012-NMCERT-005, ___ P.3d
___ (No. 30,343, May 24, 2012).
241
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tion2 against two doctors employed at its facility.3 The case arose when
Lillian Martinez and her husband, Jose Martinez, brought a medical malpractice action against the Hospital, claiming that it was vicariously liable4
for the negligent medical treatment Mrs. Martinez received from Doctors
Duarte-Afara and Dickinson. The Hospital subsequently sought indemnification from the two doctors for any judgments that could be rendered
against it at trial.
On December 6, 2004, Mrs. Martinez underwent a hysterectomy at
the Hospital. Shortly thereafter, on December 9 and 10, she experienced
respiratory problems and suffered brain damage. Mr. and Mrs. Martinez
filed a medical malpractice action against the Hospital on December 4,
2007,5 which was only six days before the statute of limitations period
expired under the Act.6 The Hospital was served with the Martinezes’
complaint on December 11, 2007, which was exactly one day after the
limitations period expired under the Act.7 The Martinezes’ complaint alleged that the Hospital failed to adequately monitor Mrs. Martinez after
surgery, administered inappropriate or excessive medications, failed to
timely and properly diagnose and treat her respiratory problems, and
failed to timely diagnose and treat her during a life-threatening
emergency.8
The Martinezes filed their petition with the New Mexico Medical
Review Commission (NMMRC) on March 6, 2008, as required by the
Act.9 On March 12, 2008, the Martinezes amended their complaint to include the doctors as defendants, but the district court granted the doctors’
motions for summary judgment and dismissed them as parties based on
the statute of repose.10 More than a year after receiving service of the
2. The court of appeals’ opinion stated that the Hospital did not specify whether
it was seeking traditional or proportional indemnification. Id. ¶ 14, 267 P.3d at 73.
However, the Hospital’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the New Mexico Supreme
Court stated that it sought proportional equitable indemnification. Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 3, Christus St. Vincent Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011NMCERT-010 (No. 30,343, Oct. 12, 2011), cert. quashed, 2012-NMCERT-005, ___
P.3d ___ (No. 30,343, May 24, 2012).
3. Christus St. Vincent, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 5, 267 P.3d at 71–72.
4. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 4–5 (The district court also
held that the Hospital was vicariously liable for alleged negligence of Doctors DuarteAfara and Dickinson as a matter of law.).
5. Christus St. Vincent, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 2, 267 P.3d at 71.
6. See NMSA 1978 § 41-5-13 (1976).
7. Christus St. Vincent, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 28, 267 P.3d at 76–77.
8. Id. ¶ 2, 267 P.3d at 71.
9. Id. ¶ 3, 267 P.3d at 71; see also infra Part III.A.3 (discussion of New Mexico
Medical Review Commission creation and importance).
10. Id. ¶¶ 3–4, 267 P.3d at 71.
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Martinezes’ complaint, the Hospital filed third-party complaints for indemnification against Doctors Duarte-Afara and Dickinson on December 22, 2008, and March 19, 2009, respectively.11 The doctors then each
moved to dismiss the Hospital’s third-party complaint based on the expiration of the Act’s limitations period.12 The district court granted their
motions but then granted the Hospital’s motion to reconsider the dismissals.13 The doctors requested interlocutory review by the court of appeals,
which issued the opinion discussed herein on May 9, 2011.14 The court of
appeals held that the Hospital’s indemnification action was subject to the
Act’s statute of limitations period and was thus time-barred.15 Upon the
issuance of the court of appeals’ decision, the Hospital filed a petition for
certiorari with the New Mexico Supreme Court on September 14, 2011,16
which the court granted. It then quashed certiorari on May 24, 2012.17
Two primary concerns arise with the court of appeals decision in
Christus St. Vincent. First, the opinion neglects to comprehensively consider the competing policy concerns and legal principles supporting statutes of repose and indemnification. The opinion evidences the court’s
view that the policy supporting the Act’s statute of repose takes precedence over those behind indemnification. This note discusses the importance of indemnification, which is not articulated by the court, and
explains its apparent conflict with statutes of repose. Second, the court of
appeals did not thoroughly explore the clash between fairness and the
application of the Act’s statute of repose to hospitals’ indemnification
claims against their doctors. In Christus St. Vincent, the Hospital’s cause
of action for indemnification was time-barred before the Hospital had
knowledge of it. This undermines basic concepts of fairness while demonstrating the potential need for the New Mexico Legislature and courts to

11. Id. ¶ 5, 267 P.3d at 71–72.
12. Id. ¶ 6, 267 P.3d at 72.
13. Id. ¶ 7, 267 P.3d at 72.
14. Id.
15. Id. ¶ 32, 267 P.3d at 77.
16. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 4–5. In its petition, the Hospital made several arguments. First, it contended that the case concerns an issue of
considerable public interest that should be decided by the New Mexico Supreme
Court. Id. at 9. Second, it claimed that its equitable indemnity cause of action was an
independent, equitable claim, rather than a malpractice claim. Id. at 10. Third, it argued that a plain language interpretation of the Act does not include indemnification.
Id. at 13. Fourth, it stated that the application of Section 41-5-13 to the Hospital’s
indemnification claim violates due process. Id. at 15.
17. N.M. SUP. CT., CERTIORARI TABLE 2012-NMCERT-005 (May 2012), http://
www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCERT/2012/12cert-05.pdf (quashing cert for
Christus St. Vincent).
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revisit New Mexico’s laws governing the accrual date of a medical malpractice action under the Act.
III. BACKGROUND OF INDEMNIFICATION LAW AND THE
NEW MEXICO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT
A. Medical Malpractice Act
1. Background and Purpose of the New Mexico Medical Malpractice
Act
In 1976, the New Mexico Legislature adopted the Medical Malpractice Act in response to a medical malpractice crisis.18 The Act specifically
applied to malpractice claims19 against healthcare providers,20 and it also
provided benefits to both healthcare providers and patients.21 Moreover,
it imposed new provisions to guide future malpractice claims, such as a
limitations period and the creation of the NMMRC.22 Since its adoption,

18. Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs., 114 N.M. 248, 251, 837 P.2d 442, 445
(1992). This crisis encompassed a national scope, and forty-five states enacted legislation to resolve it in 1975 and 1976. Ruth L. Kovnat, Medical Malpractice Legislation in
New Mexico, 7 N.M. L. REV. 5, 7 (1976–77). In New Mexico, the crisis began when
Travelers Insurance Companies withdrew as the underwriter of the New Mexico Medical Society’s professional liability insurance due to rising costs. Id. at 7–8. At that
time, ninety percent of the state’s healthcare practitioners and institutions participated in the Society’s liability program. Id. at 8 n.11.
19. The Act broadly defines the term “malpractice claim” as “any cause of action
arising in this state against a health care provider for medical treatment, lack of medical treatment or other claimed departure from accepted standards of health care
which proximately results in injury to the patient, whether the patient’s claim or cause
of action sounds in tort or contract.” NMSA 1978 § 41-5-3(C) (1977). Claims that
have been excluded from the meaning of malpractice claim include those relating to a
physician’s alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and those originating
from deliberate indifference to a prison inmate’s medical needs. See Trujillo v. Puro,
101 N.M. 408, 683 P.2d 963 (Ct. App. 1984); Cordray v. Cnty. of Lincoln, 320
F.Supp.2d 1171 (D.N.M. 2004).
20. The term “health care provider” is equally inclusive and is defined as a “person, corporation, organization, facility or institution licensed or certified by this state
to provide health care or professional services as a doctor of medicine, hospital, outpatient health care facility, doctor of osteopathy, chiropractor, podiatrist, nurse anesthetist or physician’s assistant.” NMSA 1978 § 41-5-3(A).
21. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-2 (1976) (purposes include promoting the health and welfare of the people of New Mexico by providing professional liability insurance to
providers).
22. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-13 (1976) (creating the statute of limitations and repose);
NMSA 1978 § 41-5-14 (1976) (establishing the NMMRC).
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the courts have promoted a broad interpretation of the Act and its
scope.23
2. Benefits to Providers
The Act provides numerous benefits to healthcare providers, but it
requires them to seek “qualification” under the Act to reap these benefits. This distinction between qualified and nonqualified providers impacts both providers and patients.24 To reap the benefits and be obligated
by the burdens of the Act, a provider must meet several requirements
outlined by Section 41-5-5.25 Providers who choose not to abide by these

23. See Wilschinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 775 P.2d 713 (1989) (holding that
physicians owe a duty to third persons who may be foreseeably harmed by that physician’s negligence in treatment of his patient, and that the Act encompasses such thirdparty claims).
24. Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs., 114 N.M. 248, 252, 837 P.2d 442, 446
(1992). Providers who are not qualified under Section 41-5-5 do not benefit from the
Act’s statute of limitations or damages award cap, and they do not receive secondary
insurance coverage from the Patient Compensation Fund. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-5
(1992). Patients who receive treatment from nonqualified providers may still go
before the NMMRC in the event of alleged malpractice, but participation in NMMRC
hearings by the provider is voluntary. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-14. Moreover, patients are
not bound by the statute of limitations in the Act if they receive negligent treatment
from a nonqualified provider; instead, their action does not begin to accrue until three
years following their discovery of their injury. NMSA 1978 § 37-1-8 (1976); NMSA
1978 § 41-5-13 (1976), held unconstitutional in Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123,
100 P.3d 204.
25. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-5; see also Div. of Ins., N.M. Pub. Reg. Comm’n, New
Mexico Patient’s Compensation Fund Frequently Asked Questions, INSURANCE, http://
www.nmprc.state.nm.us/insurance/docs/PCFFAQs.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). The
Patient Compensation Fund provides secondary insurance coverage to qualified providers who are sued under the Act. It also caps the damage awards against these providers at $600,000, although this is exclusive of medical expenses and punitive damages.
To seek qualification, an individual physician must obtain $200,000 in coverage per
occurrence from an authorized insurer. Id. Doctors and individual physicians must
carry primary coverage for up to three claims per year. For a hospital to receive qualification, it must first obtain a primary layer of coverage in an occurrence-based policy
from an authorized insurer, complete a detailed application, and hire an actuary to
estimate its future losses that will require coverage by the Patient Compensation
Fund. Id.
According to the Division of Insurance, which manages the Patient Compensation Fund, the majority of the policies for providers covered by the Patient Compensation Fund are written by one insurance company (American Physicians Assurance
Corporation) with the remaining claims being written by two remaining companies.
Id.
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requirements are considered to be nonqualified providers,26 and they do
not receive the benefits of qualification under the Act.27
By offering specific benefits to practitioners who seek qualification
under the Act, the legislature sought to curb the medical malpractice crisis by encouraging participation.28 Thus, the legislative intent supporting
the Act included an interest in “making available professional liability
insurance for health care providers in New Mexico.”29 The two primary
benefits of qualification are a limitations period that includes a statute of
repose and a cap on damage awards for malpractice liability.30
The limitations period is the most relevant benefit to the discussion
of indemnification herein, and it is thus explored in greater detail.31 The
Act provides a patient three years from the date of the malpractice occurrence in which to file an action against the provider.32 Depending upon
when the patient discovers the injury from malpractice, the statute functions either as a statute of limitations or a statute of repose.33 It acts as a
statute of limitations when it limits the plaintiff to filing a malpractice

26. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-5; see also Div. of Ins., supra note 25. The types of providers who can seek qualification under the Act include doctors, chiropractors, podiatrists, nurse anesthetists, physician’s assistants, hospitals, and outpatient healthcare
facilities. Division of Insurance, supra note 25. The Division of Insurance estimates
that the Patient Compensation Fund currently covers about 1,800 doctors, including
doctors’ business entities, one hospital, and a few podiatrists, chiropractors, and physician’s assistants. Id.
27. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-5(C). Malpractice actions against nonqualified providers
are governed by Section 37-1-8. NMSA 1978 § 37-1-8 (1976).
28. Moncor Trust Co. v. Feil, 105 N.M. 444, 446, 733 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Ct. App.
1987).
29. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-2 (1976).
30. See NMSA 1978 § 41-5-5; NMSA 1978 § 41-5-6 (1992).
31. NMSA 1978 §41-5-13 (1976), the limitations period, is the most relevant portion in this decision because its date of accrual directly conflicts with the date of accrual of an indemnification claim.
32. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-13 (coined the “date of occurrence” rule of accrual). The
only enumerated exception in the statute relates to minors under the age of six who
are victims of malpractice, and the court has separately addressed the due process
ramifications of this exception in Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 100 P.3d 204
(A child’s due process rights are violated by requirement that a victim under the age
of six must file by his ninth birthday or forever lose claim to his action when his
guardian fails to file the suit in time.).
33. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-13; Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 1996NMSC-035, ¶ 31, 918 P.2d 1321, 1331. That is, if a patient discovers an injury one year
after the occurrence, the Act functions as a statute of limitations and provides the
patient two years in which to file a claim. If the patient instead discovers an injury
four years after the occurrence, the Act functions as a statute of repose and bars the
patient’s claim.

R

R
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claim within three years of the date of accrual, which is defined by the
date on which the malpractice occurred.34 It also functions as a statute of
repose by barring a malpractice claim after three years from the date of
occurrence.35 The fundamental difference between these two applications
of the limitations period is that the statute of limitations does not expressly place a time bar on the plaintiff’s cause of action based on the
date of occurrence.36 Instead, it describes the accrual date and the length
of time in which the plaintiff may file his or her action. The statute of
repose is thus more final, as it provides the date on which the plaintiff is
barred from pursuing a claim, regardless of knowledge of the injury.37
This distinction is more easily understood in a jurisdiction where the
discovery rule is applied to a medical malpractice cause of action. In such
a jurisdiction, the statute of limitations provides that the plaintiff’s claim
accrues on the date that the injury is discovered, and it gives the plaintiff
a specified amount of time to file that claim after the accrual date. The
statute of repose may state that a plaintiff has a maximum of five years
after the date of occurrence in which to file a malpractice action. Thus, a
plaintiff who does not discover an injury until six years after the date of
occurrence is barred from filing an action, regardless of the jurisdiction’s
use of the discovery rule. New Mexico’s approach is complicated by the
fact that the date of occurrence rule applied to the accrual of malpractice
actions essentially creates a system in which the statute of limitations
transforms into a statute of repose exactly three years after the date of
occurrence.38
When crafting statutes of limitations, the legislature uses one of
three approaches to define the accrual date: (1) the day of the wrongful
act (“date of occurrence rule”); (2) the day when pain is first experienced
by the plaintiff; or (3) the day that the cause of the pain and wrongful act
is discovered (“discovery rule”).39 Prior to the adoption of the Act, New
Mexico courts established that the date of occurrence rule40 governed

34. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-13; see also Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs., 114 N.M.
248, 250, 837 P.2d 442, 250 (1992). The date that the malpractice occurred is commonly referred to as the “date of occurrence.”
35. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-13.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899(c) (1979) (“Statutes of limitations
ordinarily provide that an action may be commenced only within a specified period
after the cause of action arises.”).
37. Id. § 899(g).
38. See id. § 899 (general explanations of statutes of repose and limitations).
39. Ron Horn, The Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Actions, 6 N.M.
L. REV. 271, 272 (1975–76).
40. This is also called the “wrongful act rule.” Id. at 273.
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medical malpractice actions.41 The application of the occurrence rule survives today.42 After the three-year period following the date of occurrence, the statute becomes a statute of repose and completely bars claims
against the provider stemming from that date.43 Thus, patients are effectively prohibited from bringing claims that do not accrue within three
years of the date of occurrence.44 This strict application of the limitations
period is rooted in the legislature’s desire to see claims litigated before
the parties’ memories fade or evidence is lost or destroyed.45
The courts have addressed the constitutionality of this limitations
period and held that it is supported by rational basis.46 With few exceptions, it does not violate a patient’s rights to due process, equal protection,47 and access to the courts.48 However, the courts have been more
flexible in their determination of the date of accrual when possible viola41.
42.
43.
Torts,

Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d 250 (1963).
See, e.g., Pacheco v. Cohen, 2009-NMCA-070, 213 P.3d 793.
NMSA 1978 § 41-5-13 (1976). According to the Restatement (Second) of
statutes of repose are typically longer than statutes of limitations. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 (g) (1979). The Act does not comply with this norm
and instead uses a three-year time period for both.
44. See Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-020, ¶ 23, 116 P.3d 105, 113.
45. Moncor Trust Co. v. Feil, 105 N.M. 444, 446, 733 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Ct. App.
1987). The courts have articulated two primary objectives of statutes of limitations,
which are: “(1) preventing revival of stale claims where ‘evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared,’ and (2) acting as statutes of repose
by creating a time when ‘one is freed from the fears and burdens of threatened litigation.’ ” Horn, supra note 39, at 283 (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 453 P.2d
631, 632 (1969)).
46. Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 1996-NMSC-035, ¶ 37, 918 P.2d
1321, 1332.
47. Although the patients who are injured by nonqualified providers are permitted three years after the date that they discover their injuries to file a claim, and
patients who are injured by qualified providers only have three years following the
date of occurrence under Section 41-5-13, the supreme court has held that this does
not violate the latter patient’s equal protection rights. Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La
Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 538, 893 P.2d 428, 434 (1995) (holding that equal protection is
not implicated because the classification in the Act “classifies claims not according to
the status or character of the plaintiff but according to the status or character of the
defendant”).
48. Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035, ¶ 27, 918 P.2d at 1330; La Farge, 119 N.M. 532,
893 P.2d 428. The court applied the same test and reached the same conclusion in
Armijo v. Tandysh, which affirmed the constitutionality of applying a limitations period to wrongful death actions. 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245 (Ct. App. 1981), overruled
by Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. Health Serv., 114 N.M. 248, 837 P.2d 442 (1992). Plaintiffs
have also brought claims alleging that the distinction between qualified and nonqualified providers violates their due process rights by limiting the amount of time in which

R
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tions of these rights arise.49 For example, in Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La
Farge, the court addressed a medical malpractice claim that did not become known to the patient until near the end of the three-year period.50
The court determined that the application of Section 41-5-13 would violate the patient’s substantive due process rights,51 and instead applied the
three-year statutory period as an accrual-based limitation applicable to
other personal injury claims,52 as if the statute of repose did not exist.53
For a patient to bring a successful constitutional challenge to the limitations period in the Act, he or she must demonstrate that there is no rational basis for the legislature’s application of unique rules to qualified
healthcare providers compared to other tortfeasors.54 However, these
challenges are unlikely to succeed because New Mexico’s courts have
clearly established the intention to permit different limitations periods for
malpractice compared to other personal injury actions.55
they can bring a claim; the courts have found these arguments to be unsubstantiated.
See Armijo, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245.
49. La Farge, 119 N.M. at 537, 893 P.2d at 433. Additional exceptions have been
made in cases involving fraudulent concealment. See Keithley v. St. Joseph’s Hosp.,
102 N.M. 565, 689 P.2d 435 (Ct. App. 1984); Tomlinson, 2005-NMSC-020, 116 P.3d
105 (places burden of proving fraudulent concealment on patient to toll statute of
limitations and requires patient to still file fraudulently concealed claim discovered
within three-year period before expiration of limitations period if remaining time is
“constitutionally adequate”); Juarez v. Nelson, 2003-NMCA-011, 61 P.3d 877, overruled by Tomlinson, 2005-NMSC-020, 116 P.3d 105; Kern ex rel. Kern v. St. Joseph
Hosp., Inc., 102 N.M. 452, 697 P.2d 135 (1985) (statute of limitations not tolled when
patient should have known of the malpractice in spite of fraudulent concealment, and
that silence can constitute fraudulent concealment).
50. La Farge, 119 N.M. at 534, 893 P.2d at 430.
51. Id. at 539–40, 893 P.2d at 435–36. The supreme court provided minimal reasoning for this holding, stating that the Act’s limitations period “left an unconstitutionally short period of time within which the [plaintiffs] could file suit after [the
injured party’s] cause of action accrued.” Id. at 540, 893 P.2d at 436. Although the
injured party in La Farge was a child and the malpractice suit was brought by the
minor’s parents on his behalf, the supreme court did not address this factor in its
consideration.
52. Id. at 542, 893 P.2d at 438 (applying the general personal injury statute of
limitations in Section 37-1-8, which would have applied to the plaintiff’s negligence
claim had the Act never been enacted). NMSA 1978 § 37-1-8 (1976).
53. La Farge, 119 N.M. at 542, 893 P.2d at 438.
54. Id. at 539, 893 P.2d at 435.
55. Kern ex rel. Kern v. St. Joseph Hosp., Inc., 102 N.M. 452, 459, 697 P.2d 135,
142 (1985) (citing departure from general personal injury limitations period based
upon the date of injury applied by the supreme court in Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285,
383 P.2d 250 (1963)). Moreover, the supreme court has held that Section 41-5-13 is
not ambiguous and that it must therefore be followed as written. Id. at 459, 697 P.2d
at 142.
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3. Benefits to Patients
The Act also benefits patients, primarily by streamlining the process
of bringing a medical malpractice suit.56 Prior to the passage of the Act,
plaintiffs were required to locate expert providers from the same locality
as the defendant.57 At the time of the Act’s passage, many perceived a
“judicial inhospitability in New Mexico to reducing the plaintiff’s burden
of establishing a malpractice claim.”58 Since plaintiffs have traditionally
found it very difficult to locate willing expert witnesses to participate in
medical malpractice trials,59 the Act had the effect of loosening the challenge for plaintiffs of obtaining an expert to present testimony at trial.60
The trial courts are also vested with the power to determine whether an
expert witness is required,61 although they do so in the majority of circumstances,62 but the unwaiveable requirement is gone.63 This change made it
easier for plaintiffs to bring malpractice suits based in res ipsa or other
Prior to the passage of the Act, medical malpractice actions were subject to the
same limitations periods as other personal injury actions. Horn, supra note 39, at 271.
Medical malpractice, however, is distinct from other torts since the plaintiff may not
be immediately aware of medical malpractice and an injury may be latent. Id. For
other types of personal injuries, the date of occurrence and date of discovery are
typically the same. Nonetheless, the Act applies a date of occurrence rule for accrual
of actions to medical malpractice. Id.
56. The Act’s purpose in Section 41-5-2 aims to “promote the health and welfare
of the people of New Mexico,” and Section 41-5-23 provides expert witness assistance
to patients who are successful at the NMMRC. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-2 (1976); NMSA
1978 § 41-5-23 (1976).
57. Kovnat, supra note 18, at 12.
58. Id. at 17.
59. Id. at 10–11.
60. Id. at 17.
61. Gerety v. Demers, 92 N.M. 396, 589 P.2d 180 (1978) (medical expert should be
used when trial court reasonably decides that it is necessary to inform jurors); Lopez
v. Reddy, 2005-NMCA-054, ¶ 9, 113 P.3d 377, 380 (expert should be used when physician’s standard of care is challenged).
62. The year after the Act was passed by the legislature, the Supreme Court announced in Pharmaseal Laboratories, Inc. v. Goffe that: “[i]t is not mandatory in
every case that negligence of the doctor be proved by expert testimony,” although
“[n]egligence of a doctor in a procedure which is peculiarly within the knowledge of
doctors, and in which a layman would be presumed to be uninformed, would demand
medical testimony as to the standard of care. However, if negligence can be determined by resort to common knowledge ordinarily possessed by an average person,
expert testimony as to standards of care is not essential.” Id. at 758, 568 P.2d at 594.
63. UJI 13-1101 NMRA (permits court to omit certain parts of instruction “in
those cases in which the court determines that expert testimony is not required and
negligence can be determined by resort to common knowledge ordinarily possessed
by the average person”). The court also held in Lopez v. Reddy, that“[i]n a medical
malpractice case, because of the technical and specialized subject matter, expert medi-
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doctrines that are easily understandable to lay jurors and do not require
expert testimony.64
The Act also required plaintiffs to bring their claims against qualified providers before the NMMRC in advance of filing a complaint with
the court.65 The NMMRC assembles a panel of attorneys and doctors who
determine whether the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence of the act
upon which the complaint is based and whether there is a reasonable
medical probability that the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from malpractice
in relation to that act.66 Because the NMMRC will determine if the allegedly negligent physician is a qualified provider after receiving the plaintiff’s complaint, it accepts complaints against both qualified and nonqualified providers.67 In the event that the Department of Insurance notifies the NMMRC that the allegedly negligent provider is not qualified
under the Act, the patient may still receive a NMMRC hearing upon the
stipulation of the parties and the patient’s payment of a nominal fee.68
The hearing is held within sixty days of the NMMRC’s receipt of the patient’s application.69 If the NMMRC finds for the plaintiff, it will assist the
plaintiff with locating an expert to assist with trial preparation and testimony.70 These provisions seek to encourage the settlement of meritorious
claims71 and to provide credible plaintiffs with expert assistance at trial.72
While the NMMRC requirement in Section 41-5-14 can provide useful assistance to plaintiffs, it also serves as a benefit to qualified provid-

cal testimony is usually required to establish departure from recognized standards in
the community.” 2005-NMCA-054, ¶ 9, 113 P.3d at 380.
64. Mireles v. Broderick, 117 N.M. 445, 448, 872 P.2d 863, 866 (1994) (expert may
be used in res ipsa medical malpractice cases but is not required).
65. This process tolls the statute of limitations provided by the Act until thirty
days after the NMMRC mails its decision to the parties’ attorneys. NMSA 1978 41-522 (1976); see also N.M. Med. Soc’y, Policies and Procedures, N.M. MED. REV.
COMM’N 7, part 9(c)(1), http://www.nmms.org/files/uploaded/files/Handbook2011.pdf
(last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
66. No expert testimony is permitted at the NMMRC hearing, and the Commission’s policies state that “[t]he policy of the Commission is to provide an inexpensive
forum that does not involve the need for expert testimony . . . The panelists are the
experts.” N.M. Med. Soc’y, supra note 65, at 5, part 8(c)(4).
67. Id. at 2, part 3 (providing for voluntary panel for claims against nonqualified
providers).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 3, part 5.
70. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-23 (1976); see also Kovnat, supra note 18, at 30.
71. Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 493, 503, 697 P.2d 493, 503 (Ct. App. 1984).
72. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-23 (provision of expert).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\43-1\NMX107.txt

252

unknown

Seq: 12

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

3-MAY-13

14:03

[Vol. 43

ers.73 While patients who prevail at the NMMRC receive assistance from
the panel, unsuccessful patients may be deterred from filing a malpractice
complaint with the court.74 Additionally, a panel decision that is favorable
to a doctor may increase the likelihood that the plaintiff will accept a low
settlement offer. The pendency of panel proceedings also tolls the Act’s
limitations period,75 which is a policy that the courts have approved.76 The
NMMRC is not required to hear claims brought against nonqualified
providers.77 The courts have held that this limited jurisdiction of the NMMRC does not violate the substantive due process rights of nonqualified
providers78 and comports with the legislative purpose of the Act.79
B. Indemnification in New Mexico
1. Basics
Indemnification is fundamentally rooted in principles of liability,
and it exists to “allow a party who has been held liable for an injury but
who was not at fault to seek recovery from one who was at fault.”80 The
fundamental principles of indemnification in New Mexico were articulated in In re Consolidated Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litigation.81 As
stated in that case, the cause of action for indemnification is rooted in
equity, can arise by operation of law to prevent an unjust result, and can
arise without an express or implied agreement.82 New Mexico recognizes

73. Otero, 102 N.M. at 503, 697 P.2d at 503 (NMMRC benefited providers by
reducing the filing of frivolous or non-meritorious claims).
74. Id. at 503, 697 P.2d at 503 (NMMRC benefited providers by reducing the filing of frivolous or non-meritorious claims).
75. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-22 (1976). Because Section 41-5-13 functions as both a
statute of limitation and repose, the plaintiff’s claim will not be barred during the
pendency of these proceedings based upon either the passage of the statute of limitation or repose. However, if a plaintiff is granted a stay by the court to first file an
application with the NMMRC and fails to file the NMMRC petition as instructed, his
or her action may be dismissed by the court. Belser v. O’Cleireachain, 2005-NMCA073, 114 P.3d 303.
76. Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-020, 116 P.3d 105.
77. N.M. Med. Soc’y, supra note 65, at 2 part 3.
78. Otero, 102 N.M. 493, 697 P.2d 493.
79. Id.
80. In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. 542, 550, 893 P.2d
438, 446 (1995).
81. 119 N.M. 542, 893 P.2d 438 (1995); see also id. at 545, 893 P.2d at 441 (explaining the difference between contribution and indemnification).
82. Id. at 546, 893 P.2d at 442 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 341 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Dessauer v.
Memorial Gen. Hosp., 96 N.M. 92, 97, 628 P.2d 337, 342 (Ct. App. 1981) (quoting
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two distinct types of indemnification: traditional and proportional.83 In
Christus St. Vincent, the Hospital did not identify which type of indemnification it sought when filing its third-party complaint against Doctors
Duarte-Afara and Dickinson.84
New Mexico allows employers who have been held vicariously or
derivatively liable for their employees’ negligent conduct to bring actions
of equitable indemnification.85 Equitable indemnification is available only
when the indemnitor and indemnitee are both liable for the third party’s
injuries.86 The lack of a mutual agreement and several other circumstances87 can preclude the indemnity action, and the burden rests upon
the indemnitee to demonstrate that the indemnitor is “at least partly liable to the original plaintiff for his or her injuries.”88
2. Traditional Indemnification
Traditional indemnification allows an indemnitee who is held liable
for damages to recover compensation from a third-party tortfeasor (in-

Aalco Mfg. Co. v. City of Espanola, 95 N.M. 66, 618 P.2d 1230 (1980) (Indemnity is
“deeply rooted in the principles of equity, fair play and justice.”)).
83. N.M. Pub. Schs. Ins. Auth. v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 2008-NMSC-067, ¶
23, 198 P.3d 342, 349 (citing Otero v. Jordan Rest. Enters., 1996-NMSC-047, ¶ 14, 922
P.2d 569 (traditional indemnification for vicarious liability); In re Consol. Vista Hills
Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. at 551–53, 893 P.2d at 447–49 (equitable proportional
indemnification in limited situations)).
84. Christus St. Vincent Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 14,
267 P.3d 70, cert. quashed, 2012-NMCERT-005, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 30,343, May 24,
2012).
85. Gallagher, 2008-NMSC-067, ¶ 22, 198 P.3d at 348; see also Yelin v. Carvel
Corp., 119 N.M. 554, 556, 893 P.2d 450, 452 (1995) (listing situations in which equitable indemnification applies). Either a traditional or proportional indemnification
claim can be crafted as an equitable indemnification claim, where applicable. Gallagher, 2008-NMSC-067, ¶ 23, 198 P.3d at 349.
86. Gallagher, 2008-NMSC-067, ¶ 25, 198 P.3d at 349. In Christus St. Vincent, the
Hospital was held directly liable for the actions of its nurses and vicariously liable for
the actions of Doctors Duarte-Afara and Dickinson. At trial, the jury awarded damages to the Martinezes in the amount of $1.1 million. Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 2, at 5–6.
87. Gallagher, 2008-NMSC-067, ¶ 27, 198 P.3d at 349 (citing examples of when
equitable indemnification is not available: “(1) the indemnitor and the indemnitee
have an express or implied contractual relationship of any kind; (2) the indemnitee is
not at fault for the injury; and (3) allowing an indemnity claim would prevent the
unjust enrichment of the indemnitor”).
88. Id. ¶ 28, 198 P.3d at 350 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 886(B)(1)).
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demnitor) who may or may not be the primary wrongdoer.89 Primarily,
“the whole purpose of traditional indemnification is to shift liability from
one who is not at fault to one who is at fault.”90 By shifting the blame, it
allows a party who has been held responsible for damages but who was
not actively at fault to recover compensation.91 The court must find that
the indemnitee was passive in its relation with the indemnitor, rather than
active92 or equally at fault.93 Typically, traditional indemnification applies
only when an independent, preexisting legal relationship exists between
the indemnittee and indemnitor.94 Despite New Mexico’s adoption of
comparative negligence95 and proportional indemnification,96 traditional
89. Budget Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc. v. Bridgestone, 2009-NMCA-013, ¶ 12, 203 P.3d
154; In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. 542, 545, 893 P.2d 438,
441 (1995).
90. In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. at 549, 893 P.2d at
445.
91. Id. at 546, 893 P.2d at 442.
92. Id. at 542, 546, 893 P.2d at 442 (citing Krametbauer v. McDonald, 44 N.M.
473, 104 P.2d 900 (1940). In In re Consolidated Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litigation,
the court recognized New Mexico’s adoption of the active/passive and in pari delicto
tests for indemnification. An active indemnitee “has personally participated in an affirmative act of negligence, was connected with negligent acts or omissions by knowledge or acquiescence, or has failed to perform a precise duty which the indemnitee
had agreed to perform. Id. at 547, 893 P.2d at 443.
However, a passive indemnitee “fail[ed] to discover and remedy a dangerous
situation created by the negligence or wrongdoing of another.” Id. at 547, 893 P.2d at
443; Robert A. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L.
REV. 130, 154 (1932–33). If the court determines that both the indemnitee and the
indemnitor were active parties, then indemnification is denied. In re Consol. Vista
Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. at 546, 893 P.2d at 442 (citing Kramethbauer, 44
N.M. at 481, 104 P.2d at 904).
93. In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. at 546, 893 P.2d at 442
(citing Krametbauer, 44 N.M. 473, 104 P.2d 900 (New Mexico adopted active/passive
and equally-at-fault tests for indemnification)). The concept of being equally at fault
is based in the legal doctrine of in pari delicto, which is Latin for “in equal fault.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 676 (9th ed. 2009). If the parties are in pari delicto, indemnification is not permitted. Dessauer v. Mem’l Gen. Hosp., 96 N.M. 92, 97, 628 P.2d
337, 342 (Ct. App. 1981) (citing Standhardt v. Flintkote Co., 84 N.M. 796, 508 P.2d
1283 (1973); Harmon v. Farmers Mkt. Food Store, 84 N.M. 80, 499 P.2d 1002 (Ct.
App. 1972)).
94. In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. at 545–46, 893 P.2d at
441–42 (citing Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 215 F.2d 368,
370 (10th Cir. 1954)); also see id. at 546, 893 P.2d at 442 (referencing that no New
Mexico case has ever denied indemnification to a passive wrongdoer solely because
this relationship was absent).
95. See Trujillo v. Berry, 106 N.M. 86, 87, 738 P.2d 1331, 1333, cert. denied, 106
N.M. 24, 738 P.2d 518 (1987) (The court explained the goals of comparative negligence as: “(1) apportionment of fault among negligent parties whose negligence proxi-
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indemnification, which shifts 100 percent of liability, remains applicable
in certain situations.97 It can be used by one tortfeasor to recover from the
primary tortfeasor, and it may also be used by a nonnegligent employer
to recover from his employee for that employee’s negligence.98
3. Proportional Indemnification
In 1995, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of
proportional indemnification,99 whereby a partially responsible indemnitee can recover from another partially responsible indemnitor.100 This approach “appl[ies] comparative fault principles to indemnification claims
and replac[es] the all-or-nothing rule of traditional indemnification with a
system of apportioning damages according to relative fault.”101 A state
typically adopts proportional indemnification principles after replacing its
doctrine of contributory negligence with comparative fault.102 New Mexico’s use of proportional indemnification was expected when it adopted
comparative fault in 1981.103

mately causes any part of a loss or injury, and (2) apportionment of the total damages
resulting from such loss or injury in proportion to the fault of each party.”) (emphasis
in original) (citation omitted).
96. See discussion of proportional indemnification supra Part III.B.3.
97. Trujillo, 106 N.M. at 87, 738 P.2d at1333 (citing Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying
Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1983)).
98. Id. at 87–88, 738 P.2d at 1333–34 (citing Dessauer, 96 N.M. 92, 628 P.2d 337).
99. This concept is often confused with the doctrine of contribution by practitioners, the courts, and legal scholars.
100. In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. 542, 552, 893 P.2d
438, 448 (1995).
101. Id. at 551, 893 P.2d at 447 (citing as an example Allison v. Shell Oil Co., 113
Ill.2d 26, 32–34, 99 Ill.Dec. 1115, 119–20 (1986) (replacing active/passive distinction
with comparative-fault doctrine); Schneider Nat’l Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d
561, 576–77 (Wyo. 1992) (replacing “all-or-nothing rule” with relative-fault doctrine).
102. In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. at 551, 893 P.2d at 447
(citing as examples Am. Motorcycle Ass’n v. Super. Ct., 20 Cal.3d 578, 146 Cal.Rptr.
182 (Cal. 1978); Herndon, 716 F.2d at 1332.
103. Id. at 547, 893 P.2d at 443 (citing Herndon, 716 F.2d at 1332 (reasoning that
New Mexico’s adoption of comparative negligence suggested it would also join other
comparative-negligence states’ adoption of comparative indemnification); id. at 447,
893 P.2d at 551 (citing New Mexico’s adoption of comparative fault by “judicial fiat”
in Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 690, 634 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1981)); see also Bartlett v.
N.M. Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 159, 646 P.2d 579, 586 (Ct. App. 1982), cert
denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982), superseded by statute, NMSA 1978 § 41-3A1 (1987), as recognized in Payne v. Hall, 2006-NMSC-029, ¶ 11, 137 P.3d 599, 604
(New Mexico Court of Appeals abrogated joint and several liability among joint
tortfeasors, adopted apportionment of damages on basis of individual tortfeasor
fault).
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However, the court limited the scope of proportional indemnification by holding it inapplicable when a factfinder determines that concurrent tortfeasors are proportionally liable to the injured party.104 New
Mexico’s prior adoption of comparative negligence and several liability
ensures that a joint tortfeasor will be held liable only for the percentage
of damages for which he or she is responsible.105 The doctrine of proportional indemnification is applicable, however, when no other doctrine is
available by which the joint fault of tortfeasors can be prorated.106
4. Effect of Vicarious Liability upon Indemnification Action
Indemnification actions are further complicated by allegations of
negligence as a result of a party’s vicarious liability.107 If the party who
settles or against whom a judgment is assessed is the primary wrongdoer,
he or she may not make a claim for indemnification against the employer
who was also joined as a party under the doctrine of respondeat superior.108 Rather, “[w]here a master is vicariously liable for the tort of his
servant, the servant has no possible claim to contribution from the
master.”109 However, if a judgment is assessed against a “blameless employer” sued under respondeat superior rather than the primarily responsible party, that employer may “recover[ ] from a negligent employee,
after the employer has been held liable to the injured third person under
the theory of respondeat superior.”110
5. Accrual of Indemnification Action
A cause of action for indemnification111 accrues when one party discharges another party’s liability through a settlement or the satisfaction
104. In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. at 552, 893 P.2d at
448.
105. Id. at 551, 893 P.2d at 447 (referencing Scott, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234);
Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586.
106. In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. at 553, 893 P.2d at
449.
107. Dessauer v. Mem’l Gen. Hosp., 96 N.M. 92, 97–98, 628 P.2d 337, 342–43 (Ct.
App. 1981) (citing NMSA 1978 § 41-3-1).
108. Id. (citing Melichar v. Frank, 78 S.D. 58, 98 N.W.2d 345 (1959)).
109. Id. at 98, 628 P.2d at 343.
110. Id. at 97, 628 P.2d at 342 (citing Rio Grande Gas Co. v. Stahmann Farms, Inc.,
80 N.M. 432, 457 P.2d 364 (1969)); Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. Welch, 78 N.M. 494,
433 P.2d 79 (1967)).
111. Black’s Law Dictionary defines indemnify as “[t]o reimburse (another) for a
loss suffered because of a third party’s or one’s own act or default; hold harmless” and
indemnification as “[t]he action of compensating for loss or damage sustained.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (9th ed. 2009); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 886B cmt. a (1979) (providing that a “suit for indemnity is brought to recover
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of a judgment.112 However, a court may not dismiss an indemnification
suit as premature if an indemnitor has not yet paid the underlying judgment.113 A cross-claim or third-party complaint for indemnification can be
filed while the underlying suit is pending, with the indemnification judgment to be determined after the underlying judgment is rendered.114 An
indemnification claim is not viable if one of multiple joint tortfeasors discharges its liability through a settlement and the disputes with the remaining tortfeasors remain unresolved.115
C. Due Process – Statutes of Limitation
In New Mexico, statutes of limitation are “purely creatures of statute” established by the legislature.116 Statutes of limitation are to be
strictly construed117 and interpreted “according to their plain, literal
meaning, provided such an interpretation does not result in injustice, absurdity, or contradiction.”118 The Act’s statute of limitations seeks “to
protect prospective defendants from the burden of defending against
stale claims while providing an adequate period of time for a person of
ordinary diligence to pursue lawful claims.”119 The Act’s statute of repose
“put[s] an end to prospective liability for wrongful acts that, after the
passage of a period of time, have yet to give rise to a justiciable claim.”120

the total amount of the payment by the plaintiff, on the ground that the plaintiff’s
conduct was not as blameworthy as the defendant’s”).
112. Budget Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc. v. Bridgestone, 2009-NMCA-013, ¶ 14, 203 P.3d
154, 159 (citing generally N.M. Pub. Schs. Ins. Auth. v. Gallagher & Co., 2008-NMSC067, ¶¶ 22–26, 198 P.3d 342, 348–50).
113. Bd. of Ed., Sch. Dist. 16, Artesia, Eddy Cnty. v. Standhardt, 80 N.M. 543, 547,
458 P.2d 795, 799 (1969).
114. Id. (citing NMSA 1953 § 24-1-12(2); 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶¶ 13.34, 14.08–14.10 (2d ed. 1961)) (additional citations
omitted).
115. Standhardt, 80 N.M. at 547, 458 P.2d at 799 (citing NMSA 1953 § 24-1-12(3)).
116. Jaramillo v. State, 111 N.M. 722, 725, 809 P.2d 636, 639 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing
51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 9 (1970)).
117. Slade v. Slade, 81 N.M. 462, 463, 468 P.2d 627, 628 (1970).
118. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Armijo, 103 N.M. 174, 175, 704 P.2d 428, 429
(1985) (citing Atencio v. Bd. of Ed., 99 N.M. 168, 655 P.2d 1012 (1982)).
119. Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 537, 893 P.2d 428, 433 (1995).
Attempts in the New Mexico courts to argue that statutes of limitation violate due
process have been generally unsuccessful, and the supreme court has emphasized that
the U.S. Supreme Court views them as congruent with due process. Id. at 541, 893
P.2d at 437. Equal protection challenges to statutes of limitation have also proved
unsuccessful. Jaramillo, 111 N.M. at 723, 809 P.2d at 637.
120. La Farge, 119 N.M. at 537, 893 P.2d at 433.
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Deference to legislative intent has been evident in the courts’ treatment of the statutes of limitation and repose under the Act. However, the
court has permitted flexibility in the statute of limitations when necessary
to avoid a due process violation. In Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge,121
the New Mexico Supreme Court extended the statute of limitations when
the plaintiff remained unaware of his claim until eighty-five days before
the expiration of the deadline.122 The supreme court determined that “due
process requires that [the plaintiffs] have a reasonable time within which
to bring suit.”123 It held eighty-five days to be an “unconstitutionally
short” period of time in which to file a medical malpractice action.124
Thus, the case established that a statute of repose that gives a plaintiff an
“unreasonably short period of time within which to bring an accrued
cause of action” violates due process.125 A year later, the supreme court
ruled in Cummings v. X-Ray Associates of New Mexico that the year-anda-half time period in which the plaintiff had to file her claim was sufficient to comport with due process and to bar her untimely claim.126
IV. RATIONALE OF THE COURT IN CHRISTUS
ST. VINCENT V. DUARTE-AFARA
A. Introduction
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reviewed this matter de novo, as
it principally concerned a question of statutory construction and required
the court to apply the requirements of the Act to the facts of the case.127
The court began its review by recounting the history and purpose of the
Act, which was enacted in response to a perceived medical malpractice

121. 119 N.M. 532, 893 P.2d 428. In La Farge, the defendant physician failed to
diagnose the minor plaintiff’s medical condition, which caused the child cardiac arrest
and irreversible brain damage. Id. at 532, 893 P.2d at 428.
122. Although the plaintiffs initially claimed that the statute of limitations should
be tolled because the malpractice was fraudulently concealed from them until eightyfive days before the statute expired, the supreme court held that this issue was moot.
Id. at 537, 893 P.2d at 433.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 540, 893 P.2d at 436.
125. Id. at 542–43, 893 P.2d at 437–38.
126. 1996-NMSC-035, ¶ 42, 918 P.2d 1321, 1333. The supreme court has emphasized that its holdings in these two important medical malpractice cases, Cummings
and La Farge, are to be viewed as “complementary.” Tomlinson v. George, 2005NMSC-020, ¶ 23, 116 P.3d 105, 113.
127. Christus St. Vincent Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 9,
267 P.3d 70, 72, cert. granted, 2011-NMCERT-010 (Oct. 12, 2011) (No. 33,166) (citing
Bd. of Comm’rs of Rio Arriba Cnty v. Greacen, 2000-NMSC-016, ¶ 4, 3 P.3d 672, 674)
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insurance crisis in New Mexico.128 The Act provides professional liability
coverage to healthcare providers who become qualified providers under
the provisions of the Act and accept the associated burdens and benefits
of qualification.129 One such benefit of qualification under the Act is the
limitations period enumerated in Section 41-5-13, which states that, “[n]o
claim for malpractice arising out of an act of malpractice . . . may be
brought against a health care provider unless filed within three years after
the date that the act of malpractice occurred.”130 Moreover, the court articulated that while the Act applies only to healthcare providers, the legislature intended a broad interpretation of the concept of medical
malpractice.131 The parties in this case did not appear to dispute the fact
that Doctors Duarte-Afara and Dickinson were both qualified healthcare
providers under the meaning of the statute.132
B. Indemnification Discussion
The court then proceeded to a discussion of indemnification, noting
that the issue raised by the interlocutory appeal was “whether an equitable indemnification claim falls within the ambit of this broadly defined
concept [of medical malpractice].”133 The court defined both traditional
and proportional equitable indemnification, the two types recognized in
New Mexico, and stated that while the Hospital failed to mention which
type of indemnification it sought, the New Mexico Supreme Court standard for each is identical.134 To succeed on an indemnification claim, the
indemnitor must be partially liable to the original plaintiff for her injuries.135 Moreover, the indemnitee must claim in its indemnification com128. Id. ¶ 10, 267 P.3d at 72 (citing Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs., 114 N.M.
248, 251–52, 837 P.2d 442, 445–46 (1992)).
129. Id. (citing Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035, 918 P.2d 1321, for a discussion of the
benefits and burdens of qualification under the Act).
130. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-13 (1976).
131. Christus St. Vincent, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 13, 267 P.3d at 73 (citing Wilschinsky
v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 517, 775 P.2d 713, 719 (1989)).
132. See id. (As the issue of Doctors Duarte-Afara and Dickinson being qualified
under the Act is not discussed in the court of appeals’ opinion, it is not considered to
be a central issue of dispute in this case.).
133. Id. ¶ 13, 267 P.3d at 73.
134. Id. ¶ 14, 267 P.3d at 73 (citing N.M. Pub. Schs. Ins. Auth. v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 2008-NMSC-067, ¶ 23, 198 P.3d 342, 349 (defining traditional and proportional indemnification)). Gallagher defines traditional indemnification as an all-ornothing right of recovery from a third party by the person who has been held liable
for another’s wrongdoing. 2008-NMSC-067, ¶ 23, 198 P.3d at 349. It defines proportional indemnification as partial recovery from another for his or her fault by a defendant. Id.
135. Gallagher, 2008-NMSC-067, ¶ 28, 198 P.3d at 350.
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plaint that the indemnitors caused direct harm to the original plaintiff and
in some way discharged their liability for this harm.136
The Christus St. Vincent opinion reiterated that the legislature intended a broad construction of the term “malpractice claim” as it is used
in the Act.137 In the court’s view, a claim constitutes malpractice under the
Act if the “gravamen of the third party action is predicated upon the
allegation of professional negligence by a practicing physician.”138 On this
point, the court held that the gravamen of the Hospital’s equitable indemnification claim was predicated upon the allegation that Doctors Duarte-Afara and Dickinson caused and were partially liable for Lillian
Martinez’s injuries.139 Thus, the court held that the Hospital’s third-party
indemnification claim constituted a malpractice claim under the Act.140
Although the court of appeals’ holding adopted the view advanced
by the doctors, the court addressed the arguments presented by the Hospital.141 The Hospital argued that prior cases clearly demonstrated that
the limitations period for an indemnification action begins running at the
time of the payment of the underlying claim, judgment, or settlement.142
Additionally, the Hospital asserted that a third-party plaintiff’s cause of
action for either indemnification or contribution is recognized as being
distinct from the tort claim asserted by the plaintiff in the underlying
suit.143 Two Missouri cases cited by the Hospital held that Missouri’s medical malpractice statute of limitations did not apply to indemnification or
contribution suits.144
The New Mexico Court of Appeals found these arguments posited
by the Hospital unpersuasive, and it held that the Act is based on different policy concerns than those articulated in the Missouri decisions.145
While the court admitted that a cause of action for indemnification had

136. Id. ¶ 30, 198 P.3d at 350.
137. Christus St. Vincent, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 15, 267 P.3d 70, 73–74.
138. Id. ¶ 15, 267 P.3d at 74 (citing Wilschinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 517–18,
775 P.2d 713, 719–20 (1989)). Black’s Dictionary defines “gravamen” as the substantial point or essence of a claim, grievance, or complaint. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
604 (9th ed. 2009).
139. Christus St. Vincent, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 15, 267 P.3d at 74.
140. Id. ¶ 20, 267 P.3d at 75.
141. Id. ¶¶ 17–19, 267 P.3d at 74.
142. Id. ¶ 17, 267 P.3d at 74.
143. Id.
144. Id. ¶ 19, 267 P.3d at 74–75 (citing Rowland v. Skaggs Co., 666 S.W.2d 770
(Mo. 1984) (holding that the medical malpractice statute of limitations does not apply
to contribution suits) and Aherron v. St. John’s Mercy Med. Ctr., 713 S.W.2d 498 (Mo.
1986) (applying Rowland holding to indemnification suits)).
145. Id.
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long been recognized as a separate and distinct suit from the underlying
tort, it determined that the gravamen inquiry was the controlling test.146
Therefore, it held that indemnification falls under the term “malpractice
claim” as used in the Act, as the gravamen of the claim is the allegation of
professional negligence by the doctors.147
Because indemnification, in the court’s view, is a “malpractice
claim” under the Act, the district court properly dismissed the Hospital’s
third-party complaint as untimely.148 If the Hospital were permitted to
proceed with its indemnification claim after the limitations period expired, this would make the doctors susceptible to ongoing potential liability and would contravene the purpose of the Act.149
C. Due Process Discussion
After determining that indemnification qualified as a malpractice
claim under the Act, the court proceeded to the Hospital’s argument that
the application of the Act’s limitations period in this situation violated
due process.150 The Hospital alleged that the limitations period gave it an
unreasonably short amount of time in which to file its indemnification
claim. By filing their negligence complaint on December 4, 2007, the Martinezes allowed the Hospital only six days in which to file a third-party
complaint.151 However, since the Hospital was not served with the Martinezes’ complaint until the day after the statutory limitations period expired, it claimed that it had no time in which to file its indemnification
claim and that the application of Section 41-5-13 to dismiss its claim was
an impermissible violation of due process.152
In its de novo review of this question, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals emphatically disagreed with the Hospital’s contentions.153 The
court reiterated that the legislature may concurrently impose statutory
time limitations for filing claims and comply with due process.154 Statutes
of limitation are permissible so long as they allow a “reasonable time
146. Id. ¶ 18, 267 P.3d at 74 (citing Maurice T. Brunner, When Statute of Limitations Commences to Run Against Claim for Contribution or Indemnity Based on Tort,
57 A.L.R.3d 867 § 4(a) (1974)); id. ¶ 15, 267 P.3d at 74 (discussion of gravamen inquiry); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 604 (9th ed. 2009) (explanation of gravamen inquiry).
147. Christus St. Vincent, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 18, 267 P.3d at 74.
148. Id. ¶ 30, 267 P.3d at 77.
149. Id. ¶ 16, 267 P.3d at 74.
150. Id. ¶¶ 21–30, 267 P.3d at 75–77.
151. Id. ¶ 21, 267 P.3d at 75.
152. Id.
153. Id. (de novo review because addresses constitutional questions).
154. Id. ¶ 22, 267 P.3d at 75.
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within which existing or accruing causes of action may be brought.”155 To
determine whether the limitations period comports with due process, the
court considered cases in which plaintiff-patients filed medical negligence
actions after the limitations period expired.156 Since the Hospital and the
doctors did not address the issue of whether the due process rights of
plaintiff-patients differ from those of third-party indemnitees, the applicability of these cases to the present dispute was not questioned.157
Three cases highlight the court’s understanding of the interplay between Section 41-5-13 and due process. In Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La
Farge, a boy learned that he was a victim of possible medical malpractice
only eighty-five days before the Act’s statute of limitations expired.158 The
court held that due process required an extension, and he was permitted
to file his action for malpractice seven months after the statutory deadline.159 The second case referenced by the court was Cummings v. X-Ray
Associates of New Mexico, wherein the patient knew that she was a victim
of medical malpractice for a year and a half before the expiration of the
limitations period.160 When she failed to file her claim before the Act’s
deadline, the court held that due process had not been violated since she
had “more than adequate time to take action, but failed to do so.”161 Finally, the court considered Tomlinson v. George, which concerned a
plaintiff who discovered he had suffered malpractice only a few months
after the occurrence, but he failed to file his claim until seven months
after the limitations period expired.162 The court there held that due process was not violated when his claim was barred for noncompliance with
Section 41-5-13.163
In the court of appeals’ view, these three cases required it to identify
three specific dates in a case’s history to make a due process evaluation.164
These included the date of occurrence (when medical malpractice occurred), the discovery date (when the existence of medical malpractice is

155. Id. ¶ 21, 267 P.3d at 75 (citing Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532,
541, 893 P.2d 428, 437 (1995)).
156. Id. ¶¶ 22–26, 267 P.3d at 75–76.
157. Id. ¶ 26, 267 P.3d at 76.
158. Id. ¶ 23, 267 P.3d at 75 (citing La Farge, 119 N.M. at 542, 893 P.2d at 438).
159. Id. ¶ 23, 267 P.3d at 75–76 (citing La Farge, 119 N.M. at 542, 893 P.2d at 438).
160. Id. ¶ 24, 267 P.3d at 76 (citing Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C.,
1996-NMSC-035, ¶ 57, 918 P.2d 1321, 1336).
161. Id. (citing Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 57–58, 918 P.2d at 1336–37).
162. Id. ¶ 25, 267 P.3d at 76 (citing Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-020, ¶ 4, 116
P.3d 105, 107).
163. Id. (citing Tomlinson, 2005-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 23–24, 116 P.3d at 113–14.
164. Id. ¶ 27, 267 P.3d at 76.
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discovered), and the Section 41-5-13 expiration date.165 In the present
case, the dates of occurrence were December 9 and 10, 2004, the statutory
limitations period expired on December 10, 2007, and the discovery date
was December 11, 2007.166 The Hospital claimed that the discovery date
should have been construed as December 4, 2007—the date that the Martinezes filed their complaint. However, the doctors believed that the discovery date should have been December 9 or 10, 2004—the dates that the
malpractice occurred, or December 11, 2007—the date that the Martinezes’ complaint was served upon the Hospital. The court agreed with
the doctors and held that the earliest possible discovery date was December 11, 2007, and may indeed have been much later.167
The actual discovery date was relevant to this determination since
the Act’s limitations period functions as both a statute of limitations and
a statute of repose.168 Section 41-5-13 functions as a statute of limitations
during the three years following the alleged act of malpractice.169 When
the three-year limitations period expires, Section 41-5-13 functions as a
statute of repose and bars any claims relating to that occurrence of malpractice.170 The Hospital received service of the Martinezes’ complaint on
December 11, 2007, but Section 41-5-13 transitioned into a statute of repose the previous day.171 Because the Hospital did not discover its indemnification claim until Section 41-5-13 was already functioning as a statute
of repose, it was essentially barred from bringing its claim before it discovered its existence.172 The court of appeals thus affirmed that the Hos-

165. Id.
166. The discovery date used by the court references the date on which the plaintiff
in the third-party complaint, the Hospital, discovered its injury, which was the filing of
the Martinezes’ negligence complaint. Id. ¶¶ 28–29, 267 P.3d at 76.
167. Id. ¶ 29, 267 P.3d at 77. On this point, there is insufficient reasoning given for
why the discovery date may be actually much later. Rather, the Hospital previously
requested that the court allow it to modify the record proper submitted to the New
Mexico Court of Appeals to include an affidavit by the Hospital’s risk manager, which
would establish that the Hospital received notice of the Martinezes’ claims on December 8, 2007. Motion for Rehearing at 4, Christus St. Vincent, 2011-NMCERT-010 (No.
30,343, Oct. 12, 2011), cert. quashed, 2012-NMCERT-005, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 30,343,
May 24, 2012).
168. Christus St. Vincent, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 30, 267 P.3d at 77.
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 1996-NMSC-035, ¶ 50,
918 P.2d 1321, 1335).
171. Id. ¶ 29, 267 P.3d at 77.
172. The Act’s limitations period bars claims that are brought more than three
years after the date of occurrence, which here was either December 9 or 10, 2004. Id.
¶ 27, 267 P.3d at 76 (noting that date of occurrence is not in dispute between parties).
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pital’s claim was permissibly barred without violating its due process
rights.173
D. Equal Protection Discussion
Although the Hospital claimed that its equal protection rights were
violated by the application of Section 41-5-13 to its indemnification claim,
this argument was not well developed.174 Essentially, it claimed that if the
indemnification claim was dismissed as untimely, it would be the only
party responsible for compensating Lillian Martinez for her injuries.175
Additionally, the Hospital reiterated that the legislature did not include
third-party claims in the Act’s definition of “malpractice claim.”176 The
court of appeals did not address any question of equal protection, and it
instead held that the Hospital had merely rehashed its previous arguments without raising any new ones about this issue.177
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CHRISTUS ST. VINCENT DECISION
A. Clash Between Indemnification and Statute of Repose
Although the court of appeals’ holding may be congruent with the
doctor-protective policy goals of the Act, the court failed to adequately
address the apparent conflict between indemnification law and the Act’s
statute of repose. The court held that because the indemnification action
here is in the nature of medical malpractice, it falls under the Act’s definition of medical malpractice.178 In so holding, the court ignored the two
competing public policies of protecting physicians and patients—public
health versus provider protection.179 It also failed to address the inconsistency between New Mexico’s principles of indemnification and the Act’s

Thus, the Hospital’s cause of action for indemnification was time-barred under Section 41-5-13 on December 10, 2007. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-13 (1976).
173. Christus St. Vincent, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 30, 267 P.3d at 77.
174. Id. ¶ 31, 267 P.3d at 77.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. ¶ 18, 267 P.3d at 74 (gravamen of the claim is predicated upon the allegation of professional negligence).
179. The Act’s dual purpose of protecting the health and welfare of New Mexicans
and providing professional liability insurance to doctors was clearly articulated by the
legislature. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-2 (1976). In the Act, the legislature did not provide
that one of these interests was to dominate the other. Thus, any analysis that considers extending the Act’s scope or purpose, as was done by the court in Christus St.
Vincent, should consider the potential ramifications upon both patients and providers.
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statute of repose.180 By masking the tension between the very nature of
indemnification and medical malpractice actions, the court missed an opportunity to consider and weigh the unique policies behind indemnification and the statute of repose. Moreover, the court of appeals’ holding
implied that in the area of medical malpractice, the statute of repose is
supported by stronger public policy interests and concerns than is
indemnification.
The court of appeals notably neglected to define the concepts so
crucially implicated by its decision. First, black letter indemnification law
provides that an indemnification action does not accrue until the underlying judgment or settlement is obtained.181 Second, a statute of repose absolutely bars any suits brought after the expiration of the limitations
period,182 and the accrual of a medical malpractice action for statute of
repose purposes begins on the date of occurrence.183 By calling an indemnity claim that arises in the context of a medical malpractice “medical
malpractice,” the court ignored the potential inconsistency between these
two concepts. If indemnification falls under the Act’s definition of medical malpractice and is subject to the Act’s statute of repose, due process
concerns arise when the indemnitee does not receive notice of its potential indemnification claim before the Act’s statute of repose arises.184
While the courts have firmly held that even an undiscovered injury
is barred by the statute of repose,185 this problem is likely to become more

180. Rather than evidencing a discourse of the competing interests implicated by
its decision, the court of appeals ruling seems to convey that indemnification in this
context is medical malpractice simply “because we say so,” thus stifling any further
discussion of how it reconciled these two conflicting legal concepts.
181. Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, When statute of limitations commences to
run against claim for contribution or indemnity based in tort, 57 A.L.R.3d 867 § 3(a)
(1974).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899(g) (1979).
183. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-13.
184. According to the facts in Christus St. Vincent, the Hospital was served with
notice of the Martinezes’ complaint one day after the statutory period expired under
Section 41-5-13. 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 29, 267 P.3d at 77. Thus, it had no notice that its
claim for indemnity existed, which contradicts the prior standard under indemnification law that provided that such a claim was not ripe until a judgment or settlement
was entered. It could be argued that the NMMRC petition filed by the plaintiffs
against the Hospital and doctors, as well as the subsequent hearing, served as both
notice and a determination of negligence by the doctors.
185. Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 1996-NMSC-035, ¶ 50, 918 P.2d
1321, 1335. In Cummings, the supreme court also held that New Mexico does not
follow the precedent set by other states that have determined that the injured party’s
awareness of their injury is relevant to determining the date of accrual in a medical
malpractice action. Id. ¶ 53, 918 P.2d at 1336.
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endemic after the court of appeals’ ruling here. Medical malpractice
plaintiffs often file their negligence claims late in the statute of limitations
period because of its relatively short duration and the incapacity caused
by the presumed gravity of their injuries that support their malpractice
suit.186 Thus, potential indemnitees will likely be met with frequent instances where they are not notified of their right to file an indemnification action until their opportunity to do so has passed.
Moreover, while the court of appeals may have sought to uphold the
intent and black letter of the statute of repose laws, it neglected welldeveloped indemnification concepts. Indemnification exists to prevent
unjust results in the payment of judgments or settlements, which may result if a passive participant in the allegedly negligent behavior pays for
the entirety of the plaintiff’s damages without assistance from the actively
negligent parties.187 It is also premised upon the view that it is important
to hold all responsible parties accountable for their negligence by providing an avenue for parties held liable to collect from those who were actively responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries.188 Rights to indemnity are not
limitless, however, and restraints have been placed on their boundaries.189
The Christus St. Vincent decision illustrates that, in spite of the valid and
clearly articulated policy reasons supporting indemnification, the Act’s
statute of repose takes priority over these policies.
While New Mexico appellate courts have not previously addressed
the tension between indemnification and statutes of repose, the clash has
been resolved in other states. Some states have held that claims for equitable indemnity are subject to their medical malpractice statutes. South

186. The number of cases available in which injured patients filed medical malpractice suits shortly before the expiration of Section 41-5-13 supports this statement. See,
for example, the three cases referenced by the court in Christus St. Vincent, which
were: (1) Tomlinson v. George, 2005-NMSC-020, 116 P.3d 105 (learned of malpractice
months after limitations period began running but did not file claim until seven
months after expiration of the Section 41-5-13 limitations period); (2) Cummings,
1996-NMSC-035, 918 P.2d 1321 (learned of malpractice one and a half years before
running of limitations period but did not file claim until eleven months after 41-5-13
expiration date); and (3) Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 893 P.2d 428
(1995) (learned of malpractice eighty-five days before expiration of limitations
period).
187. In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. 542, 545, 893 P.2d
438, 441 (1995).
188. Id.
189. For example, in the statute governing commercial instruments and transactions, the New Mexico Legislature provided that any provision in an equipment lease
or rental contract that contains an indemnification agreement “is void, unenforceable
and against the public policy of this state.” NMSA 1978 § 56-7-3 (2007).
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Carolina190 and Illinois191 encountered factually similar situations and addressed them earlier in 2011. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that
its medical malpractice statute of repose applied to suits for contribution
or indemnification “because a suit for contribution against the insured for
damages arising out of patient care exposes insurance companies to the
same liability as if the patient were to have brought a direct action against
the insured.”192 The court also cited a prior decision wherein it held that
the same concerns apply in indemnification suits, which should therefore
also fall under the medical malpractice statute of repose.193
Using a similar approach, the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that a hospital’s indemnity claim against a doctor was properly dismissed
due to the passage of South Carolina’s medical malpractice statute of repose.194 The court premised its holding on the rule that the doctor’s liability for the third party’s injury must be shown before a hospital can prove
its entitlement to equitable indemnification.195 Because the injured plaintiff failed to include the negligent doctor as a defendant in the suit before
the statutory limitations period expired, the doctor’s negligence was
never established at trial.196 Judgment was rendered only against the hospital, which then pursued indemnification against the doctor. Because no
finding of negligence by the doctor was ever made, the court couched the
hospital’s purported indemnification claim in the case as an “action to
recover damages for injury to person,” not an action for indemnity.197
Moreover, the court found it persuasive that the South Carolina’s medical
malpractice statute “does not expressly exclude actions for equitable indemnification predicated upon proving liability in the underlying medical
malpractice action.”198

190. South Carolina also applies a different standard to medical malpractice actions than other personal injuries, and it utilizes a separate medical malpractice statute of limitations and statute of repose. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545 (1976) (applying
three-year discovery-based statute of limitations and six-year occurrence-based statute of repose).
191. § 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-212 (1982) (providing a statute of repose for medical malpractice actions).
192. Uldrych v. VHS of Ill., Inc., 942 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (Ill. 2011).
193. Id. at 537, 942 N.E.2d at 1277 (citing Ashley v. Evangelical Hosps. Corp., 594
N.E.2d 1269 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992)).
194. Columbia/CSA HS Greater Columbia Healthcare Sys. v. S.C. Med. Malpractice Liab. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 713 S.E.2d 639, 640 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011).
195. Id. at 641.
196. Id. at 642.
197. Id. at 641.
198. Id.; see also id. (citing German Evangelical Lutheran Church of Charleston v.
City of Charleston, 576 S.E.2d 150, 153 (S.C. 2003) (stating that “[t]he enumeration of
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While the South Carolina case rested on the crucial fact that there
had been no finding of negligence by the doctor,199 in Christus St. Vincent,
the trial court’s determination that the Hospital was vicariously liable for
the actions of the two doctors evidenced the jury’s finding of their negligence.200 The uniform jury instruction governing a hospital’s vicarious liability for its employees begins with the statement that “[a] hospital is
responsible for injuries proximately resulting from the negligence of its
employees,” indicating that it is predicated upon a finding of negligence
by said employees.201
In addition to the South Carolina ruling that may hinge on the lack
of a finding of negligence by the doctor, other states have also applied
their medical malpractice statutes of limitations to indemnification. Illinois held in 1992 that its medical malpractice statute of repose barred an
indemnification action brought by a hospital against alleged joint
tortfeasors.202 In so holding, the Illinois Court of Appeals mentioned the
legislature’s intent to abate a medical malpractice insurance crisis in Illinois at the time of its statute’s creation.203 Although the application of the
statute of repose to certain contribution actions may entirely bar them,
the court found this result predictable and believed that the legislature
was both aware of and intended it.204 Because of this, it ruled that the
same policy concerns require it to apply the statute of repose to indemnification actions.205 Other courts have made similar holdings and applied
their statutes of repose or limitations to indemnification actions.206
While the above cases207 lend support to the Christus St. Vincent decision, the Hospital argued that it is well-established that an indemnification or contribution208 action is a distinct cause of action from the
exclusions from the operation of a statute indicates that the statute should apply to all
cases not specifically excluded.”); discussion of Act’s purpose infra Part III.A.1.
199. Columbia, 713 S.E.2d at 642.
200. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 5–6.
201. UJI 13-1120A NMRA; see also UJI 13-1101 NMRA (defining negligence as a
provider’s failure to abide by his or her “duty to possess and apply the knowledge and
to use the skill and care ordinarily used by reasonably well-qualified doctors practicing under similar circumstances”).
202. Ashley v. Evangelical Hosp. Corp., 594 N.E.2d 1269 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992).
203. Id. at 1274.
204. Id. at 1274–75.
205. Id. at at 1274.
206. See Uldrych v. VHS of Ill., Inc., 942 N.E.2d 1274 (Ill. 2011).
207. See Ashley, 594 N.E.2d at 1274–75; Columbia/CSA HS Greater Columbia
Healthcare Sys. v. S.C. Med. Malpractice Liab. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 713 S.E.2d
639, 641 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011).
208. Indemnification is recognized as a distinct cause of action from contribution,
as contribution requires that the joint tortfeasors share a common liability. Black’s
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underlying tort claim.209 In State ex rel. General Electric Co. v. Gaertner,210
the Supreme Court of Missouri stated that the relator’s “contention that
we should measure the statute of limitations applicable to [a cause of
action for contribution] from the time the plaintiff’s claim accrues reflects
a basic misconception of both the nature of a third party claim and our
decision in [the case creating a right of contribution].”211
Although there are significant differences between indemnification
and contribution,212 several states have expressly held that their medical
malpractice limitations periods are inapplicable to contribution actions.213
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the medical malpractice statute of
repose was inapplicable when a hospital’s insurer brought a contribution
action against a doctor as a joint tortfeasor in a medical malpractice
suit.214 The Delaware Supreme Court also held that a general limitations
period, not the medical malpractice limitations period, governs contribution claims.215 An action for contribution is by definition distinct from the

Dictionary defines contribution as “[o]ne tortfeasor’s right to collect from joint
tortfeasors when – and to the extent that – the tortfeasor has paid more than his or
her proportionate share to the injured party, the shares being determined as percentages of causal fault.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 301 (9th ed. 2009); see also NMSA
1978 § 41-3-6 (1947) (providing that right to contribution among joint tortfeasors does
not impair any existing rights to indemnity); AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D § 52:38 (Russell J. Davis et al. eds., 1987) (indemnity existed at common law
but contribution is statutory creation); In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig.,
119 N.M. 542, 553, 893 P.2d 438, 449 (1995) (citing Loucks v. Albuq. Nat’l Bank, 76
N.M. 735, 747, 418 P.2d 191, 199 (1966) for liability standard for punitive damages).
In personal injury cases specifically, indemnity seeks to recover the entire
amount of the damages, while contribution requests compensation for only the indemnitor’s portion of the damages. Dessauer v. Mem’l Gen. Hosp., 96 N.M. 92, 97,
628 P.2d 337, 342 (Ct. App. 1981) (citing Rio Grande Gas Co. v. Stahmann Farms,
Inc., 80 N.M. 432, 457 P.2d 364 (1969)).
209. Christus St. Vincent Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 17,
267 P.3d 70, 74, cert. quashed, 2012-NMCERT-005, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 30,343, May 24,
2012).
210. 666 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
211. Id.; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schara, 201 N.W.2d 758, 759–60
(Wis. 1972) (holding that a contribution claim “has its roots in the underlying incident
that gave rise to personal injury” but that “[t]he cause of action accrues–becomes a
right enforceable in a court action–when one of the joint tortfeasors pays more than
his proportionate share of the damages.”).
212. See Ashley, 594 N.E.2d at 1273 (discussion of differences between contribution and indemnification).
213. See Va. Ins. Reciprocal v. Pilzer, 599 S.E.2d 182 (Ga. 2004); Reddy v. PMA
Ins. Co., 20 A.3d 1281 (Del. 2011).
214. Pilzer, 599 S.E.2d 182.
215. Reddy, 20 A.3d 1281.
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underlying tort, and it “originates with the establishment of a joint obligation on a liability shared by the tort-feasors.”216
However, the New Mexico Court of Appeals dismissed the persuasive value of these other states’ holdings in Christus St. Vincent by claiming that the policy motivations behind New Mexico’s Act are different
from those of other states’ comparable acts.217 While the original purpose
may have been to resolve New Mexico’s medical malpractice crisis of the
1970s,218 that crisis has since passed. New concerns and problems now
plague New Mexico’s medical community and resources.
Had the legislature intended to include indemnification within the
definition of medical malpractice, the Act would have explicitly stated
that. Moreover, when a law potentially conflicts with the courts’ established notions of fairness,219 the New Mexico courts have routinely held
that, “[a]s a general rule, statutes in derogation of the common law are to
be strictly construed.”220 The legislature has articulated its intent to include indemnity claims within other statutes of repose.221 For example,
the New Mexico statute that permits causes of action arising from architectural defects explicitly provides that its statute of repose also binds
indemnification and contribution suits arising from these defects.222 The
architectural defect statute of repose was passed nine years before the
Medical Malpractice Act, which demonstrates that the legislature was
cognizant of its ability to exclude or include indemnification or contribu-

216. Id. at 1286; see also Rowland v. Skaggs Co., 666 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1984).
217. The Hospital argued that other states’ courts have held that medical malpractice statutes of repose do not apply to indemnification or contribution actions. Christus St. Vincent Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 19, 267 P.3d 70,
74, cert. quashed, 2012-NMCERT-005, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 30,343, May 24, 2012). The
court of appeals dismissed these arguments and wrote: “We distinguish these cases
from New Mexico law based on policy considerations . . . New Mexico law is based
on the converse of the policy concerns articulated and acted upon in [other courts’
holdings].” Id. ¶ 19, 267 P.3d at 74–75.
218. See Kovnat, supra note 18 (discussion of medical malpractice crisis).
219. Cases such as Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 893 P.2d 428
(1995), show that the New Mexico’s courts have been at times hesitant to restrict
injured patients’ rights to file malpractice claims when they did not learn of their
injuries until near the end of the limitations period under Section 41-5-13. This suggests that the courts, while they have been deferential to the legislature’s creation of
the statute of repose, are wary of potential due process or equal protection implications for patients.
220. Albuq. Hilton Inn v. Haley, 90 N.M. 510, 512, 565 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1977) (citation omitted).
221. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 14.
222. NMSA 1978 § 37-1-27 (1967).
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tion actions when crafting statutes of repose.223 Because the Act’s statutes
of limitation and repose do not expressly include these causes of action, it
can be reasonably presumed that the legislature did not intend for these
actions to fall under the umbrella of “medical malpractice.”224
The determination of whether the Christus St. Vincent decision
serves important policy goals that parallel the original intent of the Act
depends upon the lens through which one examines its potential effects.
On the one hand, this decision may encourage hospitals to employ nonqualified providers who are not subject to the Act’s statute of repose,
which would directly contradict the purpose of the Act. A hospital employing a non-qualified healthcare provider has until it knows or should
have known of a possible indemnification action to file an indemnification suit against the allegedly negligent doctor.225 However, hospitals like
the Hospital in Christus St. Vincent that employ qualified providers are
barred from bringing indemnity actions against those doctors potentially
before the hospital even becomes aware of their negligent acts.226
The court’s Christus St. Vincent holding reiterates its concern with
protecting medical providers from unpredictable liability. The holding
may encourage doctors to seek qualification under the Act to secure the
additional protection against indemnification suits. Additionally, the decision implicitly emphasizes that hospitals do not require the same protection as doctors.227 Hospitals, unlike doctors, are less mobile and less likely
to shut their doors as a result of foreclosed opportunities for indemnification suits. Contrarily, a doctor may leave a state that treats him unfavorably in search of a practice locale that protects and immunizes him from
various types of suits. Professional liability insurers may also support the
decision, and it may lead to lower cost professional liability insurance for

223. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 14.
224. See NMSA 1978 § 41-5-13 (1976). In Brink v. Smith Company Construction,
703 N.W.2d 871, 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (two-year statute of limitations and tenyear statute of repose provided that causes of action for contribution or indemnity
accrued upon payment of a final judgment), the Court of Appeals of Minnesota held
that its construction defect statute of repose applied to contribution and indemnity
claims because the statute specifically provided a date of accrual for such actions.
225. The statute of limitations in NMSA 1978 § 37-1-8 (1976) governs general personal injury actions, which accrue when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the cause of action. Pacheco v. Cohen, 2009-NMCA-070, ¶ 9, 213 P.3d 793, 795.
226. See Christus St. Vincent Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011-NMCA-112,
267 P.3d 70, cert. quashed, 2012-NMCERT-005, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 30,343, May 24,
2012).
227. Moreover, if a public hospital is the defendant in a medical malpractice action,
recovery against that hospital is already limited to the statutory cap, and taxpayers
will not be severely burdened by the judgment. See NMSA 1978 § 41-4-19 (2007).
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doctors who are now insulated from an additional layer of claims.228 Finally, this holding may encourage doctors to practice at hospitals, where
the timing of a patient’s lawsuit may mean that they cannot be held liable
via indemnification for damages resulting from their medical malpractice.
Where doctors may have previously been motivated by the higher profits
and less structure to practice in solo or smaller medical offices, this holding may encourage them to practice at hospitals that see multitudes of
patients and where their services are most needed.229 Nonetheless, these
potentially positive outcomes of the decision are mere hypothetical benefits, and the financial consequences to hospitals unable to seek indemnification are quantifiable.
B. Balancing the Statute of Repose with Fairness
The court of appeals prioritized the policy concerns supporting the
Act’s statute of repose above those supporting the right to indemnification.230 It recognized the potential due process concerns that arise with
the application of a statute of repose but determined that these were outweighed by the need to protect doctors with a strictly applied time bar to
suits.231 Although the court’s holding clearly demonstrates that it considered the policy support for the statute of repose to be stronger, its opinion failed to include a dialogue about these issues.232

228. If doctors cannot be sued for indemnification after the passage of the statute
of limitations, then their liability insurance carrier will not be at risk for these types of
suits. Thus, those insurers may be able to entice doctors who are qualified and practice at hospitals that may pay claims with lower insurance premiums, knowing that
they will be insulated from some future claims.
229. The continual increase in emergency room wait times illustrates that most
people are seeking their medical care and treatment from hospitals. If doctors are
encouraged to practice at hospitals, this may help serve the greatest number of patients. See Tammy Worth, Agencies warn of coming doctor shortage, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, June 7, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/07/health/la-hedoctor-shortage-20100607; see also Richard Gulla, MMS News Releases, Massachusetts Medical Society Releases 2011 Study of Patient Access to Health Care, MASS.
MED. SOC’Y (May 9, 2011), http://www.massmed.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=
MMS_News_Releases&CONTENTID=54338&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.
cfm (This report indicates that many people seek routine and emergent care from
hospitals, namely emergency rooms, and that doctor shortages are likely to contribute
to longer emergency room and regular physician wait times. For the past five years,
Massachusetts has reported “critical and severe shortages” of internists and family
physicians, with a slim majority of those practices refusing new patients.).
230. See Christus St. Vincent, 2011-NMCA-112, 267 P.3d 70.
231. Id. ¶¶ 16, 30, 267 P.3d at 74, 77.
232. Id.
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Consider a hypothetical scenario that slightly skews the facts of the
Christus St. Vincent case. Suppose that instead of being served with process of the Martinezes’ complaint on December 11, the Hospital was instead served on December 9. When the Act’s statute of limitations period
expired on December 10, the Hospital would have had prior notice of the
negligence action. On December 9, the Hospital could have moved the
trial court to extend the statute of limitations so that it could file an indemnification or cross-claim against the doctors. Courts have allowed this
in other medical malpractice actions when a plaintiff received late notice
of his or her injuries.233 Alternatively, even if the Hospital still waited to
file its indemnification claim until a judgment or settlement was entered
in the Martinezes’ negligence case, its receipt of notice of the action
before the limitations period expired would have satisfied due process.
By framing the issue in this manner, it appears unfair that the Hospital’s
claim for indemnification was barred solely because the plaintiff waited
until the eleventh hour to file her negligence action.
The primary purpose behind the statute of repose was to resolve the
medical malpractice crisis of the 1970s.234 About twenty years after that
crisis, the court of appeals still held that a less restrictive limitations period “would place an unfair burden upon the medical profession.”235
Then, last year, the Christus St. Vincent court again acted to protect doctors from liability for medical malpractice damages by emphasizing the
finality of the statute of repose.236 The court may have many reasons for
its continued protection of New Mexico’s medical community, including
the ongoing struggle to entice doctors to practice here.237 However, many
alternative policies besides a restrictive statute of repose could be used to
encourage doctors to practice in New Mexico. These include generous

233. See Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 893 P.2d 428 (1995) (cited
by the court in Christus St. Vincent as due process violation tolling statute of
limitations).
234. See discussion supra note 18. Furthermore, in the time that has lapsed since
the enactment of the Act, some have disputed the severity of the medical malpractice
crisis of the 1970s, and it is now sometimes referred to as the “perceived medical
malpractice crisis.” Cummings v. X-Ray Assoc. of N.M., P.C., 1996-NMSC-035, ¶ 40,
918 P.2d 1321, 1333.
235. Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035, ¶ 38, 918 P.2d at 1332.
236. 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 30, 267 P.3d at 77 (citation omitted).
237. New Mexico has only 194 physicians per 100,000 people, whereas the national
average is 226 physicians for the same population. N.M. Dep’t of Health, New Mexico
Comprehensive Strategic Health Plan 5 (2006), http://www.health.state.nm.us/pdf/NM
CSHP.pdf.
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subsidies for their education238 and low medical malpractice recovery
caps.239 Since other options exist for protecting doctors, a less restrictive
limitations period is appropriate.
The statute of repose itself contains inherently unfair attributes. The
Act’s use of a date of occurrence rule for determining the accrual date of
an action is outdated and no longer a useful standard. In 1976, New Mexico affirmatively adopted a date of occurrence rule240 to govern the accrual of a medical malpractice action while incorporating a statute of
repose into the Act.241 While many believe that a discovery rule242 would
be fairer than the existing date of occurrence rule, such a determination
must be made by the legislature and is not subject to the court’s discretion.243 Arguably, the limitations period guiding medical malpractice actions should be particularly sensitive to the unique nature of these suits.
However, the legislature’s use of a date of occurrence rule rather than a
discovery rule ignores the primary distinction between the accrual of
medical malpractice and other personal injury actions.244
The date of occurrence rule as applied to medical malpractice actions was accepted by New Mexico courts even before the passage of the
modern Act. The New Mexico Supreme Court approved the same date of
occurrence rule in 1963 in Roybal v. White.245 The legislature’s adoption
of this court-approved accrual rule followed with the enactment of the

238. For example, Maine offers a tuition subsidy that covers fifty percent of a medical student’s cost of attendance to encourage doctors to practice in the state. ME.
REV. STAT. 20-A, § 12103-A (2009) (enacting Doctors for Maine’s Future Scholarship
Program). New Mexico utilizes a more limited medical student loan repayment program contingent upon the doctor’s service in a designated medical service shortage
area. N.M. Higher Ed. Dep’t, Health Professional Loan Repayment Program, LOAN
REPAYMENT PROGRAMS, http://hed.state.nm.us/HPLRP.aspx (last visited Dec. 20,
2012). New Mexico also offers student loans to medical students in an effort to encourage them to practice in the state, and a portion of the loans will be forgiven if the
student practices medicine in New Mexico upon graduation. N.M. Higher Ed. Dep’t,
Medical Loan-For-Service, LOAN-FOR-SERVICE, http://hed.state.nm.us/Medical.aspx
(last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
239. See discussion supra note 24 (explanation of current levels of damages caps).
240. See discussion of different date of accrual rules supra Part III.A.2.
241. See NMSA 1978 § 41-5-13 (1976) (adopting date of occurrence rule for accrual
of actions).
242. See discussion of different date of accrual rules supra Part III.A.2.
243. The court already rejected this argument in Cummings v. X-Ray Assoc. of
N.M., P.C., 1996-NMSC-035, 918 P.2d 1321.
244. See discussion supra note 55 (explaining the distinction between accrual of
medical malpractice actions under the Act and other personal injury actions).
245. Horn, supra note 39, at 273 (citing Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d 250
(1963)).

R
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Act in 1976,246 and it was also used by the majority of other jurisdictions
at the time of the Act’s adoption.247 However, the authority upon which
the New Mexico Supreme Court relied in Roybal has since been discredited.248 This dismantling of the precedent upon which New Mexico’s accrual date rule is based suggests that the legislature should adopt a
discovery rule for the accrual of medical malpractice actions.249 It is fundamentally illogical to require plaintiffs in indemnification actions to file
lawsuits before they become aware of the existence of a claim. Many
other courts have supported this position. Justice Finley, formerly of the
Washington Supreme Court, wrote that:
To say that the patient had a cause of action all the while, although no one knew about it or suspected it, may meet some tests
of legal logic or theory, but the result would hardly meet the tests
of abstract, generally applicable, or lay standards of justice.250

Emphasizing the same point, the Tennessee Supreme Court wrote that:
We find it difficult to embrace a rule of law requiring that a plaintiff file suit prior to knowledge of his injury or, phrasing it another
way, requiring that he sue to vindicate a non-existent wrong, at a
time when injury is unknown and unknowable.251

Thus, the state should abandon the date of occurrence rule that prevented the Hospital from filing its indemnity suit until after it became
aware of its potential liability for damages. As articulated by the Oregon
Supreme Court, “[t]o say to one who has been wronged, ‘You had a remedy, but before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law stripped you
of your remedy,’ makes a mockery of the law.”252 Although the court of
appeals may have been unable to alter the Act’s date of occurrence rule

246. NMSA 1978 §§ 41-5-1 to -29 (1976).
247. In Roberts v. Southwest Community Health Services, 114 N.M. 248, 252, 837
P.2d 442, 446 (1992), the court determined that, “it is . . . plausible that the legislature, in response to the perceived medical malpractice crisis, chose the time of the
negligent act rule specifically to confer its benefit on qualified health care providers”
and “we cannot blithely assume that the legislature was not aware that the time of the
negligent act rule had been under what had been characterized as a ‘constant intellectual bombardment.’ ”
248. Horn, supra note 39, at 273.
249. See id.
250. Id. at 275 (quoting Lindquist v. Mullen, 277 P.2d 724, 728 (Wash. 1954) (Finley, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)).
251. Id. at 275 n. 34 (quoting Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tenn. 1974)).
252. Id. at 275 n. 33 (quoting Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (Or. 1966) (en
banc)).
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simply because it constituted “bad policy,” it could have avoided a further
extension of an unfair rule by refusing to subject medical indemnification
claims to the same rule.253
Statutes of repose raise concerns of fairness to injured plaintiffs who
do not become aware of their injuries until after the limitations period
has passed. Although a discovery-based date of accrual would still see
instances of unfairness arise when plaintiffs fail to identify their injury by
the passage of the limitations period, it would allow for a greater balance
between the interests of injured patients and doctors. Moreover, if malpractice-related indemnification is to be classified as medical malpractice
under New Mexico law, then the same concern applies to indemnitees
who do not become aware of the underlying negligence suit until after the
expiration of the statute of limitations. The fundamental distinction between statutes of limitation and repose is that statutes of repose bear no
relation to the date of accrual and instead limit the time period in which
an action can be brought based upon the date of occurrence. Statutes of
limitations determine the time period in which claims must be filed after
the cause of action accrues.254 While the court has demonstrated some
minimal flexibility in its application and interpretation of statutes of limitations, it strictly enforces statutes of repose.255
Regardless of this concern, many jurisdictions have held, like New
Mexico, that statutes of repose as applied to medical malpractice actions
do not violate due process.256 In Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, a thirteen-year-old plaintiff brought a medical
malpractice claim after sustaining blindness in one eye as a result of mal-

253. See Bd. of Trs. of the Town of Las Vegas v. Montano, 82 N.M. 340, 343, 481
P.2d 702, 705 (1971) (“Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity and
regularity of legislative enactments, and they will not be declared unconstitutional
unless the court is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the Legislature went
outside the Constitution in enacting them.”) (citation omitted).
254. Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 613 N.W.2d 849, 859
(Wis. 2000) (providing excellent explanation of the distinction between statutes of
limitation and repose).
255. See Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 541, 893 P.2d 428, 437
(1995).
256. See Aicher, 613 N.W.2d 849; Hoffner v. Johnson, 660 N.W.2d 909 (N.D. 2003);
Mishek v. Stanton, 616 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1980) (en banc); Bowlin Horn v. Citizens
Hosp., 425 So. 2d 1065 (Ala. 1982); Brubaker v. Cavanaugh, 741 F.2d 318 (10th Cir.
1984); see also Calaway ex rel. Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2005)
(holding that medical malpractice statute of repose is constitutional as applied to minor plaintiff); Mills v. Wong, 155 S.W.3d 916 (Tenn. 2005) (holding that medical malpractice statute of repose is constitutional as applied to temporarily mentally
incompetent patient).
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practice during her newborn examination.257 Wisconsin’s medical malpractice statute of repose required a plaintiff to file no later than five
years after the date of the act or by the time the injured plaintiff reaches
the age of ten, whichever is later.258 The Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled a prior decision259 and held that the statute of repose did not violate
Wisconsin’s right-to-remedy clause.260 It also held that the statute of repose comported with an injured patient’s equal protection and procedural
due process rights.
Since New Mexico’s Act requires an NMMRC hearing to determine
the liability of any qualified provider for alleged negligence before a
plaintiff can proceed with a claim in court,261 the indemnitee does not
entirely lack knowledge of the likelihood of a negligence suit. Thus, the
date upon which a determination of negligence is made by the NMMRC
may suffice to provide an indemnitee with notice of an impending negligence claim. This notice may also provide a hospital with sufficient time
in which to file a protective indemnity claim.262
The courts are unable to change the legislatively articulated line
drawn in the Act that distinguishes, at three years after the date of occurrence, between the statute of limitations and statute of repose.263 Moreover, the line must be drawn somewhere, and statutes of repose are

257. Aicher, 613 N.W.2d at 853–54.
258. Id. at 854.
259. Id. at 854–55 (overruling Estate of Makos v. Wis. Health Care Fund, 564
N.W.2d 662 (Wis. 1997)).
260. Id.
261. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-14 (1976).
262. See discussion of protective indemnity claims infra Part VI.B.
263. The court can, however, interpret this statute to align with both due process
and legislative intent. When reviewing a statute, the court’s “primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC050, ¶ 11, 218 P.3d 868, 870 (citing State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 6, 74 P.3d 1064,
1067). To do this, the court “examine[s] the plain language of the statute as well as the
context in which it was promulgated, including the history of the statute and the object and purpose the Legislature sought to accomplish.” Id. ¶ 11, 218 P.3d at 870–71
(citing Maes v. Audubon Indem. Ins. Grp., 2007-NMSC-046, ¶ 11, 164 P.3d 934, 938).
When the court examines a term that is not explained or defined elsewhere in
the statute, then it “must consider the ordinary meaning most likely to have been in
the minds of the enacting legislators.” Id. ¶ 18, 218 P.3d at 872 (citing State v. Gutierrez, 2007-NMSC-033, ¶ 30, 162 P.3d 156, 167). Perhaps most important to the current
discussion, the court “must take care to avoid adoption of a construction that would
render the statute’s application absurd or unreasonable or lead to injustice or contradiction.” Id. ¶ 11, 218 P.3d at 871 (citing N.M. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Educ., 95
N.M. 588, 591, 624 P.2d 530, 533 (1981)).
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inherently arbitrary in nature.264 The courts have made clear that if notice
of a cause of action occurs on the statute of limitations “side” of the line,
they are able and willing to extend the limitations period to allow the
plaintiff additional necessary time to file the complaint.265 However, if a
plaintiff does not receive notice of malpractice until after the statute of
repose takes effect, the court cannot allow a claim to be filed despite the
statutory bar. This strict adherence to the distinction made in the Act
adheres to legislative intent and serves the purpose of the statute.266
The New Mexico Court of Appeals also failed to adequately address
its reason for applying the due process analyses given to patient-physician
medical malpractice negligence claims to the indemnity action here.267
From one perspective, the court of appeals was correct in applying the
patient-physician due process analysis to this case. If the court believed
that indemnification against doctors by a hospital meets the Act’s definition of malpractice, then the same analysis is applicable here as to other
types of medical malpractice.268 If the Act’s limitations period passes muster and does not constitute a violation of due process for injured plaintiffs, then the hospital’s right to seek monetary compensation for

264. Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 1996-NMSC-035, ¶ 37, 918 P.2d
1321, 1332 (citing Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (“Statutes
of limitation are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate
between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay.”)).
265. See Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 893 P.2d 428 (1995).
266. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-2 (1976) (purpose is to provide professional liability insurance to providers, which is affordable only because of the limitations provided for in
statute of repose); NMSA 1978 § 41-5-13 (1976) (providing statute of repose that bars
claims).
267. Christus St. Vincent Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 26,
267 P.3d 70, 76, cert. quashed, 2012-NMCERT-005, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 30,343, May 24,
2012). The court of appeals stated that since the parties failed to provide cases that
evaluated due process concerns in more factually-similar situations, it would use the
three cases discussed, all of which related to malpractice suits between patients and
physicians. Id.
268. If the supreme court opts to use the same due process precedent as the court
of appeals, the South Carolina Court of Appeals shed light on why this analysis is
legitimate. In Columbia/CSA-HS Greater Columbia Healthcare Sys. v. S.C. Med. Malpractice Liab., 713 S.E.2d 639, 641 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011), the court of appeals held that
“[b]ecause [the Hospital] must establish [the doctor]’s liability for [the patient]’s damages in order to show it is entitled to equitable indemnification, we find [the] Hospital’s action is an action to recover damages for injury to the person.” By converting an
equitable indemnification claim into a personal injury claim, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals effectively disregarded an important distinction that is typically
made between the two causes of action.
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damages assessed against it is necessarily also barred.269 However, an alternative view of the applicable due process standard indicates that the
use of a patient-physician medical practice analysis for indemnification
may ignore a fundamental difference between negligence and indemnification actions. Negligence actions allow an avenue of recovery for personal injuries, while indemnification actions sound in equity and seek to
equalize the distribution of damages. Thus, the due process and procedural concerns applicable to each are likely to be unique and varied. Regardless of which due process analysis is correct, the parties failed to
address this issue with the court of appeals and it remains an open
question.270
On prior occasions, New Mexico’s courts have determined that
some statutes of repose do violate due process. In Schirmer v. Homestake
Mining Co.,271 the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the ten-year
statue of repose previously included in the Workers’ Compensation
Act.272 The court considered the legislature’s goal for the statute of repose
of “assur[ing] the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical
benefits to injured and disabled workers while at the same time maintaining reasonable costs to the employers” to be legitimate and rationally
related to the statute of repose.273 However, the supreme court found it to
be unconstitutional in spite of this because the statute’s distinctions between the time periods applicable to individuals with different injuries
“arbitrarily discriminates against a group of claimants that . . . may well
contract cancer ten to fifteen years after exposure to radiation.”274 Thus,
the statute violated the substantive due process rights of claimants who
contracted cancer as a result of radiation exposure years after the passage
of the statute of repose.275 The court’s invalidation of the Workers’ Compensation Act’s statute of repose was based in its understanding that the
legitimate legislative goals of the statute were overcome by concepts of

269. The limitations period in the Act, NMSA 1978 § 41-5-13, applies equally to
any party or entity that falls under it, so it will apply uniformly to hospitals, doctors,
or anyone else who is qualified under the Act.
270. Christus St. Vincent, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 26, 267 P.3d at 77.
271. 118 N.M. 420, 882 P.2d 11 (1994). The plaintiff, a uranium miner, died of lung
cancer years after being exposed to radiation, and his spouse was unable to collect
workers’ compensation benefits due to the passage of the Workers’ Compensation
Act’s statute of repose.
272. NMSA 1978 § 52-3-10 (1986) (barring ability to seek benefits under Workers’
Compensation Act unless disability or death occurred within ten years of the last day
of employment with the employer from whom workers’ compensation was claimed).
273. Schirmer, 118 N.M. at 423, 882 P.2d at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
274. Id.
275. Id.
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fairness.276 In many ways, the implications of the Medical Malpractice Act
statute of repose are indistinguishable from those of the Workers’ Compensation Act. In light of the courts’ history of treating statutes of repose
cautiously, the court of appeals should not have overextended the Medical Malpractice Act’s statute of repose or applied it to a situation for
which it was not originally intended.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF CHRISTUS ST. VINCENT
ON NEW MEXICO LAW
The Christus St. Vincent holding is certain to have widespread consequences for future cases. The issues involved are complex and have
deeply rooted origins in various policy concerns and legal doctrines.
A. Widespread Effect on Other Indemnification Claims
Indemnification is a particularly large and complex field of law, and
the consequences of Christus St. Vincent are a worryingly open question.
As simply stated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “[t]he unexpressed premise has been that indemnity should be granted in any factual
situation in which, as between the parties themselves, it is just and fair
that the indemnitor should bear the total responsibility.”277 This broad
definition of indemnification suggests that principles of equity may require a broader application of the court of appeals’ decision to other areas of law. Because the court did not specify whether the decision applied
only to indemnification in medical malpractice actions,278 it remains unclear if all indemnifications claims will be subject to the statutes of limitation and repose that govern the underlying tort. In addition to medical
malpractice, the legislature has also crafted statutes of repose to govern
claims arising from injuries from architectural or construction defects279
and personal injuries caused by public officials or government entities.280
While various permutations and extensions of the court of appeals’
holding here may be within its intended scope, the opinion fails to clarify

276. Id.
277. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 886B(1) cmt. c (1979).
278. Christus St. Vincent Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011-NMCA-112, ¶ 32,
267 P.3d 70, 77, cert. quashed, 2012-NMCERT-005, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 30,343, May 24,
2012).
279. NMSA 1978 § 37-1-27 (1967).
280. NMSA 1978 § 41-4-15(A) (1977) (“New Mexico Tort Claims Act”); see Maestas v. Zager, 2007-NMSC-003, 152 P.3d 141 (interpretation of accrual date and intent
of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act statute of limitations).
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any such applicability.281 Lower courts applying this decision may examine the legislative intent behind other statutes of repose and hold that
the policy concerns protecting those responsible for other types of injuries deserve the same preferential treatment given to healthcare providers under this decision. For example, the statute of repose applicable to
injuries from construction defects was crafted to protect builders from
claims “arising years after [the] substantial completion” of their construction projects.282 The legislature enacted this statute to protect builders
from “the wake of judicial decisions exposing those involved in the construction industry to greater liability,” which the supreme court found to
be a valid social and economic policy.283 This purpose echoes the legislature’s motivation for the Medical Malpractice Act, which sought to protect doctors from a feared flurry of liability and litigation.284 Just as the
court of appeals held in Christus St. Vincent that the Act’s statute of repose does not differentiate among claims for medical error or indemnification, it previously determined that the construction defect statute of
repose does not recognize distinctions between different types of defect
claims.285 Thus, lower courts may determine that the resemblance in the
legislative protection of doctors and builders may justify the application
of the construction defect statute of repose to indemnity claims arising
out of construction defects. However, such an extension is not necessarily
in line with legislative intent, and the court of appeals left open the question of why doctors remain entitled to such a special level of protection.286
Another example of a possible overextension of the Christus St. Vincent holding may arise in cases brought under the New Mexico Tort
Claims Act,287 which was created to govern personal injury suits against
governmental entities and public employees. The Act includes a statute of
281. Christus St. Vincent, 2011-NMCA-112, 267 P.3d 70.
282. Coleman v. United Eng’rs & Constructors, Inc., 118 N.M. 47, 51, 878 P.2d 996,
1000 (1994).
283. Id.
284. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-2 (1976) (purpose includes providing professional liability
insurance to doctors).
285. Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 694, 568 P.2d 214, 220 (Ct. App. 1977).
286. Moreover, the court of appeals did not clarify whether the level of protection
given to doctors under the Medical Malpractice Act should exceed the level of protection given to builders under the construction defect statute or to public officials and
government entities under the Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978 § 41-4-15(A) (1977).
Without articulating the specific concerns that caused the court to treat doctors with
special care, lower courts are left to wonder whether the statute of repose itself is
indicative of a higher level of protection, or whether doctors are to be treated as a
unique class, entitled to unique protections not applicable to others who are protected
by less expansive statutes of repose.
287. NMSA 1978 § 41-4-1 (1981).
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repose that bars any claims brought more than two years after the date of
occurrence.288 Just as the Medical Malpractice Act289 sought to balance the
interests of providers and patients,290 the Tort Claims Act aimed to
“achieve balance between the public policy supporting compensation of
those injured by public employees and the public policy militating in
favor of limiting government liability.”291 By applying the Christus St. Vincent holding to the statute of repose in the Tort Claims Act, a court could
reasonably find that social workers,292 public officials responsible for
waste collection,293 or school athletic coaches294 acting within the scope of
their employment295 are entitled to the same level of protection as qualified healthcare providers. Although motivated by different policy concerns, a reasonable court could easily determine that the purposes of the
two Acts’ statutes of repose are sufficiently congruent and legitimate that
the decision can be extended to these actors.
B. Predicted Reaction from Hospitals
To avoid being time-barred in claims for indemnification, potential
indemnitees may seek to preemptively insulate themselves from liability
by including express provisions in contracts providing them with a right to
indemnification or contribution.296 Hospitals can require indemnity provisions in employment contracts as a condition of employment for any pro-

288. NMSA 1978 § 41-4-15(A).
289. Both the Medical Malpractice Act and the Tort Claims Act were enacted in
1976. NMSA 1978 § 41-5-1; NMSA 1978 § 41-4-1.
290. See discussion supra note 179 (explaining dual purpose of the Act).
291. Niederstadt v. Town of Carrizozo, 2008-NMCA-053, ¶ 14, 182 P.3d 769, 772
(2008).
292. Whitley v. N.M. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t, 184 F.Supp.2d 1146
(D.N.M. 2001) (holding that state social workers responsible for the placement of
children in foster care are covered by the New Mexico Tort Claims Act).
293. City of Albuquerque v. Redding, 93 N.M. 757, 605 P.2d 1156 (1980) (holding
that the New Mexico Tort Claims Act is applicable to public employees responsible
for waste collection and disposal).
294. Gerald v. Locksley, 785 F.Supp.2d 1074 (D.N.M. 2011) (holding that University of New Mexico assistant football coach was a “public employee” under the New
Mexico Tort Claims Act when accused of intentional torts of assault and battery).
295. Henning v. Rounds, 2007-NMCA-139, 171 P.3d 317 (New Mexico Tort Claims
Act applies to public employees acting within the scope of their public duty and
employment.).
296. This option was suggested by the court in Saiz v. Belen School District, 113
N.M. 387, 401, 837 P.2d 102, 116 n.13 (1992) (“Nevertheless, the statute [of repose in
the construction defect statute] leaves open the possibility that a party can protect
himself from the effect of the shift in liability by expressly contracting for a right of
contribution not subject to the ten-year limitation.”).

R
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vider eligible for qualification under the Act.297 This would subject
physicians to ongoing liability in direct contradiction to the Act’s goal and
would create tension within the hospital-physician employment relationship. As an alternative to crafting such adversarial employment agreements, hospitals can hire nonqualified providers or forbid their providers
from seeking qualification under the Act to prevent time-barred indemnity claims as was seen here.298
Additionally, hospitals may be encouraged to file protective indemnity claims, even though they are typically discouraged by the courts. One
court held that “[a]n indemnitee . . . is not generally in a position to bring
suit until actual payment has been made,” rejecting “the notion that ‘protective’ suits for indemnity could be filed before payment and then stayed
indefinitely.”299 Protective indemnity claims “run[ ] counter to the standard indemnity law that a cause of action does not arise until there is a
determination of liability.”300 In addition to contradicting black-letter indemnification law, protective indemnity claims will create unnecessary litigation and compromise overextended judicial resources. Thus, these
claims will counteract the courts’ interest in decreasing rather than increasing the amount of litigation before the courts. This “solution” is
likely to have several negative effects on hospitals.301

297. Providers, however, are frequently discouraged from agreeing to these
clauses. See Nine items you don’t want to find in your employment contract, TODAY’S
HOSPITALIST, Nov. 2006, http://todayshospitalist.com/index.php?b=articles_read&cnt
=95.
298. This result would directly contradict the purpose of the Act, which was to
encourage doctors to seek qualification under the Act. See NMSA 1978 § 41-5-2
(1976).
299. U.S. Cold Storage v. Matson Navigation Co., 162 Cal. App. 3d 1228, 1232–33
(1984).
300. Id. at 1233.
301. Hospitals filing protective indemnity claims may attract the attention of injured patients who were either unaware of their injuries or had not yet determined if
the severity of their injuries warranted suit. If the hospital files a protective indemnification claim against the patients’ doctors to insulate itself from liability, that action is
likely to signal to the patients that their injuries must be worthy of litigation, since the
indemnification claim will lead to the belief that the hospital is obviously concerned
about excessive liability.
Additionally, these protective claims lead to confidentiality problems with hospital ethics boards. Hospitals currently encourage participation in ethics committees,
whereby doctors routinely review the questionable or potentially negligent conduct of
their peers. Strict rules of confidentiality surround these committees, in an attempt to
encourage forthrightness and frankness about the doctors’ conduct and to encourage
joint problem-solving among the hospital’s practitioners. However, in light of the decision in Christus St. Vincent, hospitals may be tempted to use the information about
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C. Call to Action to the New Mexico Legislature to Amend the Act
To circumvent potentially undesirable extensions of the court of appeals’ decision in Christus St. Vincent, the New Mexico Legislature should
revisit the Medical Malpractice Act and update its provisions to reflect
the current climate of New Mexico’s medical services community. The
question of the fairness of the statute of repose is ripe for review again.
The legislature should act promptly to resolve the confusion surrounding
this issue and resulting from this case.
The legislature included a statute of repose within the Act to rescue
New Mexico from the medical malpractice crisis of the 1970s.302 That crisis no longer exists, and transposing current policy concerns upon the Act
does not accord with its original intent.303 By 1995, the supreme court
defended the Act on the grounds that “[t]he high cost of insurance justifies the legislative conclusion that a shorter limitations period for medical
malpractice claims was and is necessary to make malpractice insurance
more affordable and thereby encourage more physicians to carry such
insurance.”304 If the legislature wishes to maintain the relevance of the
Act, it should amend the Act’s purpose to reflect New Mexico’s current
needs. Such an amendment would include the use of a discovery rule for
the date of accrual and would explain what current threats to the medical
community warrant the continued protection of the Act.305 While the legislature may opt to retain the date of occurrence rule,306 a clearer and

potential medical mistakes garnered from these committees to file protective indemnity claims against its doctors.
302. See Kovnat, supra note 18, at 7; see also discussion supra note 18.
303. Some may argue that need for medical services in New Mexico’s economically
disadvantaged communities basically yields the same result of the Medical Malpractice Act, but this is irrelevant. The Act was created to respond to a medical malpractice crisis as it existed in 1976; that crisis has been abated, and the Act’s relevance and
applicability is now called into question. See discussion supra note 18 (discussion of
medical malpractice crisis).
304. Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 539, 893 P.2d 428, 435 (1995)
(emphasis added).
305. See discussion supra Part V.B.
306. The court may opt to retain the date of occurrence rule to which it has clung
in prior decisions. In Roberts v. Southwest Community Health Services, 114 N.M. 248,
252, 837 P.2d 442, 446 (1992), the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that “we believe that the legislature specifically chose to insulate qualified health care providers
from the much greater liability exposure that would flow from a discovery-based accrual date.” If it believes that qualified providers remain in need of these additional
protections, it may choose to disregard the potential due process concerns surrounding the date of accrual rule.

R

R
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updated presentation of the purpose of the Act would be useful for the
courts interpreting its applicability to today’s medical climate.307
Moreover, even if the courts determine that indemnification arising
as between two qualified providers should be subject to the Act’s statute
of repose, that rule should be limited to qualified providers. The courts’
past use of the date of discovery rule for nonqualified providers should
apply to the Hospital here, as it was not qualified under the Act.308
CONCLUSION
In light of the confusion left by the court of appeals’ decision in
Christus St. Vincent, New Mexico’s legal and medical communities could
benefit from a clarification of the issues involved. The court of appeals
failed to give due consideration to well-established legal doctrine of the
right to indemnification and the modern relevance of Act’s statute of repose. By updating the Act and expressly excluding indemnification actions from its scope, the legislature can reassure both the medical and
legal communities that it has exhaustively balanced the potential competing interests and consequences of the Christus St. Vincent holding.

307. The legislature may choose to retain the date of occurrence rule, and the New
Mexico Tort Claims Act includes a date of occurrence rule for its statutes of limitations as well, indicating the legislature’s intent to specifically protect certain defendants from the more flexible and enduring discovery rule. NMSA 1978 § 41-4-15
(1977). The distinction, however, is that the Tort Claims Act’s original purpose and
intent remains a concern today, while the legislature’s desire to quell a medical malpractice insurance crisis has long since dissipated.
308. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 2 n.2.
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